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Book Reviews
Henry Friendly: The Judge, the Man, the Book
HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF His ERA. By David M. Dorsen.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012. 512 pages.
$35.00.
Reviewed by Mary Coombs*
For those of us who neither live in the rarefied world of the famous nor
are aficionados of self-published memoirs by the earnest and obscure,
reading a biography of someone we knew personally is a rare event. David
Dorsen's biography of Judge Friendly-in addition to being a surprisingly
engrossing read for anyone'-was, for someone like me, both confirmatory
and revealing.
The reason to remember Henry Friendly and write-or read-his
biography is Friendly the Judge. The subtitle calls him the "greatest judge
of his era." With this assessment (if not with all his holdings), I can heartily
agree.
While one often associates Friendly with a mastery of the law, he also
had a concern for getting the facts right, which was somewhat unusual for an
appellate judge. He would pore through the record where the lawyers didn't
cite to what seemed important to him. I believe that this focus on facts
sometimes bridged his concern for reaching an outcome that seemed
compatible with justice to the parties and his desire not to distort the law for
future cases.4
* I would like to thank Warren Stem, my co-clerk, and my research assistant, Andrea Solano.
All remaining mistakes and misjudgments are my own.
1. To misquote ALICE IN WONDERLAND, it is a book with conversations but, unfortunately, no
pictures. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURE IN WONDERLAND 1 (Richard Kelly ed.,
Broadview P. 2d ed. 2011). To be honest, the audience is likely limited to lawyers, which is still
enough for respectable sales. (In 2010 there were an estimated 728,200 lawyers in the United
States. Occupational Outlook Handbook, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Apr. 26, 2012),
http://bls.gov/ooh/legal/lawyers.htm.)
2. DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS ERA (2012).
3. This focus is perhaps less surprising when one considers his background as a lawyer for
whom much of his practice was before administrative agencies and who was steeped in the forms of
common law adjudication.
4. One example is Judge Friendly's finding parallels between the theology of Paul Tillich and
the claims of Mr. Jakobson, a rather odd conscientious objector (CO), to find that Mr. Jakobson met
the statutory standard for CO status. Id. at 245-47; United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409, 415-
16 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'dsub nom. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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Dorsen provides an example of Friendly's fact consciousness in his
discussion of the Biaggi case.5 Friendly wrote an opinion that released the
transcripts of a grand jury investigation only after he knew what the grand
jury transcripts revealed; namely, confirming his suspicion that Biaggi was
trying to manipulate the courts with his motion to release in part the
transcripts of the grand jury that was investigating him.6
During my term, we had a case where a would-be author sought the
release of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms "raid manual"
under the Freedom of Information Act.7 Judge Friendly's concurring opinion
found that the manual was protected by one of the exceptions in the statute
and thus said that the plaintiff had no standing to question the
constitutionality of the procedures set out therein. Before he wrote that
opinion, however, he had instructed me to review the manual and inform him
if it did seem to authorize any unconstitutional actions by agents. I believe it
mattered to him that, in my estimation, the manual did not.9
His working process not only produced masterful opinions with great
rapidity, but it also was as good an intellectual training ground as any clerk
could receive.' 0 Immediately after the day's oral arguments, we were called
seriatim to discuss the cases for which we were responsible-a discussion
that began with him asking us what we thought." If one could give an
account of how the case should be decided that met with his approbation (if
not his concurrence), one felt an extraordinary sense of achievement (or at
least relief for not having stumbled).12 And, as Dorsen notes, that discussion
was immediately followed by the judge dictating his voting memo to his
secretary.' 3  These were inevitably the first memoranda distributed to the
other judges and, one assumes, they guided the way the case would be
analyzed.' 4  Many judges rightly assumed that they should intellectually
5. DORSEN, supra note 2, at 222-26; In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489, 494 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Friendly, J., supplemental opinion) ("It [the majority opinion] rests on the exercise of a sound
discretion under the special circumstances of this case.").
6. DORSEN, supra note 2, at 222-26.
7. Caplan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 587 F.2d 544, 548-49 (2d Cir. 1978).
8. Id.
9. I do not know if I was assigned this case in part because I had been a mentee of Yale
Kamisar. For a description of Yale Kamisar and his work, see Yale Kamisar, U. MICH. L. SCH.,
http://web.law.umich.edu/ facultybiopage/facultybiopagenew.asp?ID=20 1.
10. In addition to the interactions with the judge, one learned by watching the production of
great legal analysis and by hearing his responses to bad legal work by lawyers and, less frequently,
otherjudges. DORSEN, supra note 2, at 87-88.
11. A similar description of the judge's working methods can be found in Lawrence B.
Pedowitz, Judge Friendly: A Clerk's Perspective, 1978 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. xl, xli.
12. As Dorsen notes, Friendly could be quite cutting about poor performances by lawyers, other
judges, or clerks. DORSEN, supra note 2, at 87-88, 95-97. As I have told colleagues, he did not
suffer fools gladly, and from his intellectual perch, there appeared to be many fools.
13. Id. at 91.
14. Id. at 90-91.
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dominate their clerks; I think Friendly made a similar assumption about most
other judges.
The description of Friendly as "Greatest Judge of His Era," however,
rests not merely on the judge's working method or on his focus with facts,
but also on his contribution to jurisprudence.' 5 The term brings to mind the
iconic great judge of legal theory, Ronald Dworkin's Hercules, who can (as
all judges ideally should) find the single best solution to hard cases--one that
is consistent both with a defensible interpretation of existing law and with a
coherent understanding of deep principle.' 6  It also echoes Duncan
Kennedy's counter image of the judge as half-consciously following his
ideological predispositions in interpreting law in hard cases.' 7
Based on Dorsen's book and my impression, Friendly fits neither
model.' 8 About as well as any real judge, he sought (most of the time) to get
"the law" right, consistent with both his sense of justice to the parties and a
set of predilections that did not fit neatly into any simple liberalism or
conservatism. His substantive political views were sometimes aligned with
conservatism, particularly in his critical stance toward Warren Court
constitutional criminal procedure law, which impeded law enforcement even
where there was no plausible risk of convicting the innocent and no
fundamental right, in his view, at stake.' 9 But he also tended to favor
15. That contribution is circumscribed by the facts that he served on a lower federal court and
that I examine a period decades after he was active. His impact was larger than that position would
suggest. Since 2000, Supreme Court Justices have cited to Friendly's judicial or other writings by
name nineteen times (in Lexis Nexis, within the "Federal Court Cases, Combined" database, search
the following: COURT(supreme) and "Judge Friendly" or "Friendly, J." or "Henry J. Friendly" or
"Henry Friendly"). This is not simply an artifact of John Roberts being his former clerk; he has also
been cited by Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, Scalia, Kennedy, and Sotomayor. E.g., Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.); Stoneridge Inv. Partners,
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 177-79 (2008) (Stevens, J.); Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (Souter, J.); Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205,
210 (2000) (Scalia, J.); Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1946 (2011) (Kennedy, J.); Blueford v.
Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2057 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.).
16. See, RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 116-18 (1978) (theorizing that an
ideal judge, such as the metaphorical Judge Hercules, would have complete knowledge of the law
and sufficient time to decide all cases; in such circumstances, Judge Hercules could create the
perfect rule for a particular case that justifies the law as a whole).
17. Duncan Kennedy, Strategizing Strategic Behavior in Legal Interpretation, 1996 UTAH L.
REV. 785, 792-93.
18. Interestingly, Friendly himself does not discuss Kennedy in his writings but does briefly
mention Dworkin. After noting the jurisprudential debate "generated by" Ronald Dworkin in Hard
Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1975), which discussed whether a judge may use policy or only
principle in deciding cases where law seems indeterminate, Friendly concludes that "it is not clear
to me how far apart, in any practically significant sense, the disputants really are." Henry J.
Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 24
n.14 (1978).
19. DORSEN, supra note 2, at 188, 214-15; see also Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI L. REV. 142, 142 (1970) (arguing that "with a
few important exceptions, convictions should be subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner
supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence").
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prosecutors or unsophisticated investors in cases involving the regulation of
business.20 He also placed more consistent emphasis than either Dworkin or
Kennedy does on the role of the judge in (a) creating and maintaining a
coherent and predictable body of law,21 which he did not see as embodying a
substantive preference for conservative and liberal policy choices, 22 and
(b) leaving space for institutions to make policy choices (sometimes the
government, sometimes private institutions being protected from
government).23 Finally, he was sometimes (though not always, as Dorsen
notes) 24 more modest than Hercules. On occasion, after seeking to turn his
first analysis (usually from his voting memorandum) into an opinion, he
would be brought up short by the existing legal materials and conclude, "It
won't write." 2 5 The winning party might not change, but the argument would
be revised to be consistent with his best reading of the law he was
interpreting. Perhaps somewhere in the world there is or will be a Hercules
who can always find a "right" opinion on every topic consistent with her
philosophical principles. In the meantime, we are unlikely to find a better
judge than one like Friendly, who so often got it right, who wrote so
fluently 26 and so well, and who recognized when it "wouldn't write."
Nonetheless, a biography and a memory must also consider Friendly the
Man, particularly as it may help illuminate Friendly the Judge. The book
does so, based on interviews with surviving family, a wide range of other
judges, and famous folk who could shed light on various aspects of
Friendly's life and character. Dorsen also interviewed every clerk Friendly
had had. While each of us interacted with him intensely for only a year (and
some of us almost not at all beyond that), that year was indeed intense. As
the book demonstrates, there were common elements, but our experiences-
20. DORSEN, supra note 2, at 249-53.
21. He similarly criticized administrative agencies, largely in terms appropriate to courts as
well, for doing a poor job of "[providing] standards and reasoned analysis" for their conclusions.
Id at 295.
22. I think he would reject Kennedy's view that a preference for rules over standards is linked
to a substantive "conservative" position. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1753 (1976) (connecting the conservative attack on judicial
activism to a preference for judicial rulemaking and application of rules to judicial creation and
enforcement of standards).
23. For more on Friendly's jurisprudence, see generally Michael Boudin, Judge Henry Friendly
and the Craft ofJudging, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2010) (surveying Judge Friendly's judicial decision-
making process and noting Judge Friendly's understanding of the importance of predictability and
the maintenance of stable rules).
24. At one point, Dorsen chastises Friendly for his "creative, if not cavalier, treatment of
precedent." DORSEN, supra note 2, at 179.
25. See id. at 90-91, 150-51 (collecting examples of Friendly stating that he would change his
ruling if one could find authority for the contrary position or expressing discomfort with a result he
believed he could not avoid based on the law as it stood). Though he once said that "he could
distinguish just about every decision," he sometimes felt more constrained by the body of statutory
and decisional law. Id. at 89.
26. One stylistic quirk: he had a habit of the "not quite double negative" (like "not
unreasonable"). A Westlaw search found twenty-eight Friendly opinions using that locution.
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and our assessments of those experiences-varied. In thinking back and in
light of the book, I think those differences are in part a result of changes in
Judge Friendly over time, in part a result of differences among us, and in part
a reflection of the meshing-or not-of our personalities with his.
By the time I clerked for the judge in 1978-1979, he was on the
downward arc of a judicial career that lasted from 1959 through 1986. It was
clear that the opportunity for a Supreme Court appointment had passed. As
Dorsen notes, Friendly was at times "dispirited," if not necessarily clinically
depressed.27 He had difficult relationships with two of his three children.28
It may be that his depression was worsening---certainly we rarely saw
him cheerful. His eyesight seemed to have gotten worse with time,29 a
disability especially salient for someone whose professional life was so
bound up with reading and writing.o He seemed to flourish largely in the
company of his wife Sophie, who had the warmth and natural social skills he
lacked.3 One feels acutely what a blow it must have been when she
predeceased him.32
I was very much an atypical choice for a Friendly clerk. I was one of
only two women clerks (two years after Ruth Wedgewood) and, as a
Michigan graduate, one of only four clerks not from Harvard (more than
half), other Ivy League schools, or Chicago. I was also, unusually I
believe, a second-life law student; I turned 33 during my clerkship year.
Together these may have made for a poor fit for the judge's style in
interacting with his clerks, apart from the more intellectual aspects of the
court's work.
Friendly was a man of his time, formed in an era before feminism. He
lived in a fairly sheltered world, growing up comfortably middle-class in a
small city and living for much of his adult life in a luxurious apartment on
Park Avenue in Manhattan.34 Neither his mother nor his wife worked outside
the home. In his world, he succeeded by merit and may have been less
sensitive to how merit alone would not suffice for all.35 The judge read
27. Id. at 53.
28. Id. at 52-59.
29. Id at 341.
30. He also relied extensively on his prodigious memory. This usually served him well, though
clerks could be frustrated by his referring to some prior case that he thought relevant in a way of
little use to a clerk with less than a year's tenure and before Westlaw and Lexis, such as "the case
with the lawyer from X firm."
31. DORSEN, supra note 2, at 36-37, 55-56.
32. Id. at 339-40.
33. The other three "outreach" clerks are William Lake from Stanford, Martin Glenn from
Rutgers, and William Bryson from the University of Texas. Id at 361-66.
34. Id. at 6-10, 37.
35. Dorsen's book gives little sense of Judge Friendly's interactions with or understanding of
the lives of racial minorities. His relationship with Judaism and WASP Anti-Semitism was
complex, as shown by his somewhat inconsistent responses to Harvard President Lowell's proposal
for a quota for Jewish students. Id. at 18. My sense is that the judge was also largely insensitive to
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widely: law, history, and legal philosophy, but not apparently social sciences
or current affairs.36 His history reading, given his interests and the forms of
history most common during his formative years, would have been
intellectual and political, not social history. Only one person on the long
list of his regular correspondents was a woman.38  Dorsen notes that when
Friendly and others formed Cleary Gottlieb, two of its newly-hired nine
associates were women. 9 This was unusual at the time and place.40 We do
not know how Friendly interacted with these women lawyers. I was
unsurprised by the anecdote Dorsen recounts of Friendly's shock that Ruth
Bader Ginsburg responded negatively when he pulled out a chair for her at a
luncheon.4 1 1 Suspect the shock was genuine surprise and dismay. My
memory is that the clerks' dinners during his lifetime were held at the
Century Association, his club. I doubt that the judge even really noticed that
the Association had no women members.4 2
Similarly, I resented-more than many clerks-the "menial" tasks that
were expected of us, such as ensuring that the bench was prepared precisely
to his requirements for each sitting43 and that he always had a working pen.44
When buzzed in, you would enter, take the pen held out in his nonwriting
hand, replace the innards with those from a government issue pen and return
it to him, all without exchanging a word or glance. What was for him, as
Dorsen suggests, a manifestation of routine and hierarchy,45 felt to me like
patriarchy as well. 46
class-that there were (and are) people who grow up in economic and family circumstances that do
not dare even to dream of Harvard, though their native intelligence might have permitted them to
thrive there.
36. Id. at 10-14, 54-55.
37. His senior paper at Harvard explored the relations of Church and State in England under
William the Conqueror. Id. at 16-17.
38. Id at 101.
39. Id at 60.
40. See VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN AMERICAN
HISTORY 255 (1998) (stating that in 1939, only 14.2% of lawyers in New York were women);
David M. Margolick, Wall Street's Sexist Wall, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 1980, at 60 (stating that in the
1940s, very few lucky women found positions at New York's most prestigious law firms and almost
all found positions in trusts and estates law).
41. DORSEN,supra note 2, at 118.
42. He was hardly alone. Women were not admitted until 1989 and then only after a very
contentious battle. See Felicia R. Lee, 121 Years ofMen Only Ends at Club, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
1989, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/28/nyregion/121-years-of-men-only-
ends-at-club.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (describing the end of the long battle to end the male-
only policy of the New York Athletic Club and recounting the Century Association's admission of
women the previous year).
43. DORSEN, supra note 2, at 108.
44. Id. at 93.
45. Id at 108.
46. This may be my projection. Other clerks may not have resented this part of the job. In any
event, they were unlikely to attribute it to patriarchy.
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I do not mean to suggest that the clerkship year was some unrelieved
Dickensian misery. His work style meant there was little relaxed interaction
between judge and clerk. But clerks and secretaries could often relax and
enjoy the chambers on the other side of the judge's closed door.
Furthermore, while the judge did not show much of a warm sense of humor
with his clerks, he did have wit and cleverness.
Dorsen mentions two opinions that were pivotal in my decision to seek
and take a clerkship with Judge Friendly (though he wrote nothing quite so
clever the term I was there): Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S.
International Sales Corp.47 and Nolan v. Transocean Airlines.48 I, and at
least one of Chief Judge Kaufman's clerks, saw a mix of wit and hostility in
the way Judge Friendly, when he had arranged to ride home with Kaufman,
would interrogate him during the ride on his views of recent advance sheets
or slip opinions. As soon as the ride was arranged, Kaufman would reassign
one of his clerks to prepare him for it. Dorsen's story of Kaufman's
ignominious role in Friendly's Second Circuit nomination process49 may go a
long way in explaining this behavior, which we both thought showed more
than just a desire to save money or make conversation on Friendly's part.50
Friendly the Man-like Friendly the Judge-was a complicated
individual. And it may be that his personal history was more impressive than
even those aspects that made my clerkship a legacy. We always want our
heroes without feet of clay. We want those of great accomplishment to be
great as people. Life doesn't always cooperate. To the extent that the
judicial legacy would have been less had my clerkship been more pleasant,
that is a trade I would not-at least in retrospect-have thought worth
making.
47. 190 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ("The issue [in this case] is, what is chicken?").
Frigaliment was a contract case brought in diversity where the contract called for chickens and the
plaintiff-buyer argued that this did not extend to stewing chickens. Friendly rightly used the
standard tools of contract interpretation. As a cook and grocery shopper, I can say that stewing hens
would be found in the "chicken" section of the meat and poultry case, but I would have been deeply
unhappy if my husband had brought home a stewing hen when the grocery list included "chicken."
48. 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960) ("Our principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case,
is to determine what the New York courts would think the California courts would think on an issue
about which neither has thought."), vacated and remanded, 365 U.S. 293 (1961), adhered to, 290
F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1961). Friendly concurred in my assessment (or vice-versa); he called this his
"best opening paragraph." DORSEN, supra note 2, at 315.
49. DORSEN, supra note 2, at 74-75.
50. Id at 120-21.
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On Becoming a Great Judge: The Life of Henry J.
Friendly
HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF His ERA. By David M. Dorsen.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012. 512 pages.
$35.00.
Reviewed by Frederick T. Davis*
In writing a biography of Henry Friendly, author David Dorsen has
taken on an enormous challenge: the subtitle is "Greatest Judge of His
Era"-a claim that few who knew Judge Friendly, or are familiar with his
remarkable legal legacy, would dispute. Judge Friendly left an unparalleled
body of written opinions from his twenty-five-year career on the bench and
was a vigorous presence at the very highest level of his profession through
prolific writings, energetic participation in groups such as the American Law
Institute, and his many professional friends.' His opinions remain, even
today, among the most cited in the federal jurisprudence;2 for those who
knew him, he was an incomparably towering influence. To summarize the
life of this remarkable person, and to offer some explanation of how he
developed his formidable skills and extraordinary impact, is no easy task.
David Dorsen does a remarkable job. His biography is not only rewarding
for those who knew Judge Friendly or are familiar with his work, but also
provides a readable and accessible exploration of how one person arrived at
such a remarkable level of excellence in his profession.
I was a law clerk for Judge Friendly during the 1972-1973 term of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. As it was for every
lawyer who had this extraordinary opportunity, the year was one of the most
remarkable experiences of my professional life. Unusually for a judge who
died more than twenty years ago, his law clerks still reunite every three years
or so to share recollections about our year with the Judge and his impact on
our own thoughts and careers. This is no group of underachievers-it
includes a number of very prominent professors and judges, including the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court-yet the prevailing sentiment is
universally one of awe, occasionally tinged with a sense of fear that Judge
Friendly might somehow look over our shoulders and remind us of standards
of excellence that all of us still strain to meet.
* Frederick T. Davis is a partner in the Paris office of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP and a
member of the Paris and New York bars. He was a law clerk for Judge Friendly in 1972-1973.
1. DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF His ERA 3,131-33 (2012).
2. Id. at 353-55.
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I approached the Dorsen biography with a particular question that has
always fascinated me: how was it that the son of a small-town manufacturer
in upstate New York became the titan of his profession?3 Is it possible to
find an explanation, or even a description, of his path to brilliance? A few
years before he died, Judge Friendly permitted me to spend several hours
tape-recording his reminiscence from both before and during his judicial
career. While those recordings were transcribed, I never succeeded in editing
or publishing them, and thus was thrilled when David Dorsen took them over
and skillfully used them in his biography. Complemented by the thorough
research he has done and access to Judge Friendly's files, friends, and family,
the biography offers some clues to Friendly's emergence as one of the
principal legal voices of his generation.
The first clue may seem obvious: Henry Friendly was simply a brilliant
intellect, endowed with extraordinary skills. David Dorsen describes, and all
of Friendly's law clerks well remember, the Judge's ability to sit down at a
table with a ballpoint pen and two pads-one for the text of his opinions, the
other for the footnotes-and simply write them out in one draft, often in one
sitting, citing precedent from memory and when necessary marching over to
find the text of the decision he wanted to quote, from memory pulling exactly
the right volume of the Federal Reporter from the shelf. This technical
brilliance was not a late development. When he arrived at Harvard College
in 1919 at age 16, he had a keen interest in mathematics and took the most
advanced course in mathematics available to entering undergraduates.'
When the grades arrived, he had received the second-highest grade ever
received by a student in the history of the course. To his chagrin, however,
the holder of the highest grade-by a minuscule margin-was a classmate.
That was enough for Henry Friendly: he abandoned any dreams of becoming
a mathematician. I had heard this story before doing my oral history with
the Judge, and after confirming its basic outlines I was about to move on
when I casually asked who the other student had been. It turns out that the
competitor had been Marshall Stone, son of future Chief Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone, who went on to have a distinguished career as a Professor of
Mathematics at Harvard, and is credited with discovering several noted
theorems. To be even neck-and-neck with such a scholar would be beyond
the competence of virtually any other student, but to Henry Friendly being
anything other than the best was insufficient. He later majored in European
history, and when the time came for him to defend his thesis in an oral exam,
the number of professors and students who wanted to watch was so great that
the event took place in the Sanders Theater at Harvard College.
3. Id at 5-6, 8.
4. Id. at 371-72.
5. Id at 14.
6. See id. ("He changed his mind [about taking additional math classes] when he compared his
performance in one course [with his classmate] Stone's.").
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Undoubtedly through his mother, Friendly early on developed a passion
for learning and an intellectual curiosity of extraordinary scope. His mother
was evidently a woman of intellect and energy.7 Nor was she lacking in
ambition for her near-sighted and unathletic son: after he arrived at Harvard
College, she wrote to Professor Felix Frankfurter, who was known to her
through a family connection, and who quickly befriended this young prodigy
and did his utmost to entice him into the study of law.8 The persuasion was
not immediately successful: Friendly remained fascinated with (and deeply
knowledgeable about) European history throughout his life, and upon
graduation at the top of his class in 1923 was courted not only by Professor
Frankfurter at the law school but by the leading professors in liberal arts to
pursue a career in academics.9 After a year of studying abroad to consider
his options, he entered the law schoolm-but only really made up his mind to
commit to the practice of law after receiving his first round of grades. He
went on to achieve an academic record at Harvard Law School that,
according to many, ranks even today as the statistically highest performance
of any student in the history of the School."
The key trait that emerges from the Dorsen biography is that once
Friendly focused on the law, he made it the passion of his professional life
with a sustained and unwavering focus. With energy, curiosity, voracious
reading habits, and prodigious memory, he saw the law in all of its
dimensions-not as a series of rules to be memorized, nor even as tools to
achieve ends, but rather as a process that goes to the core of society and how
it is supposed to work. To this passionate commitment he brought insights
drawn from his remarkable knowledge of history, literature, and philosophy.
A trivial anecdote brought home to me the breadth of his reading and the
depth of his ability to recall: once when I was with him he noticed that I was
carrying a book and, with characteristic inquisitiveness, asked me what it
was. It turned out to be a long and quite dense history of Russia, which I was
going to visit for the first time later that year. "Oh," he said, "that seems
familiar, I think I read it once." But, he then went on, "I must have read a
different book because the one I read was more than one volume." I
checked, and sure enough the book I was reading was a one-volume
simplification of an exhaustive seven-volume history of Russia-which the
Judge had not only read, but mastered: when he questioned me about my
meager insights from the slimmed-down version, it was clear that his grasp
of the subject many times exceeded mine, even though he had read the
lengthy opus more than twenty years before.
7. Id. at 6-7.
8. Id. at 20-21.
9. Id at 20.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 26 (outlining Friendly's excellent academic performance at law school).
3412012]
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When he joined the bench in 1959, Friendly brought to the job
prodigious academic skills, broad learning, and more than three decades of
challenging practice-which included founding what is today one of New
York's major law firms, and serving as General Counsel for Pan American
Airways at the apex of its success as the first truly international American
airline. 12 But most importantly, he brought an uncanny ability not only to
parse a legal issue, but to see it in its three-dimensional context, shorn of
ideology or preconceived notions. Before joining the bench, for example,
Friendly had had relatively little experience with criminal procedures-he
had never been a prosecutor or a criminal defense lawyer. 3 Yet to this day,
his decisions in this area are beacons of thoughtfulness and common sense,
as well as learning. Many thought of him as a pro-government
"conservative," in part based upon a superficial interpretation of one of his
well-known articles entitled "Is Innocence Irrelevant?," in which he
questioned some aspects of federal review of state criminal convictions via
habeas corpus.14 But in each criminal case before him, his interest was in
understanding exactly what happened in the case in question, and whether
the procedures met the standards of transparency, honesty, and excellence
that society demands. During my clerkship year, he wrote opinions in at
least two instances reversing convictions because he felt that the prosecutor
or the trial judge had not acted appropriately-even though the innocence or
guilt of the accused was not really in question.15 In each case, he delved into
the facts in meticulous detail, and concluded that the process had not satisfied
acceptable standards upon which he insisted.
Judge Friendly was an internationalist. His work with Pan Am and his
law firm put him at the cutting edge of international business during and after
World War 11.16 He read widely in French, once publishing a review of a
lengthy French-language legal treatise' 7 and, as a student, remarking to a
startled professor that a text apparently written in early English was actually
in Law French, which Friendly offered to translate.' 8 But his heart was in the
common law, where his insights derived not only from American precedent
but from his deep understanding of English precedent as well. In his
12. Id. at 60-61.
13. Id. at 81.
14. Henry Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970).
15. See generally United States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1973) (reversing a robbery
conviction on the grounds that the trial judge's questioning and discernible distrust of the defense's
expert witness was both improper and prejudicial); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir.
1972) (reversing a conviction for the prosecutor's improper use of hearsay before a grand jury).
16. DORSEN, supra note 1, at 61-68.
17. Henry J. Friendly, Book Review, 54 HARV. L. REv. 169 (1940) (reviewing JEAN VAN
HouTTE, LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE DANS LES TRANSPORTS AERIENS INTERtIEURS ET
INTERNATIONAUX (1940)).
18. Michael Boudin, Judge Henry Friendly and the Mirror of Constitutional Law, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 975, 977 (2007).
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legendary Kinsman Transit tort decision,'9 where he explored and essentially
recast the law of causation,20 he delved into English precedent at some length
and with noteworthy insight-even though the applicability of that law had
not been argued by either party.2' While respectful of the separation of the
powers and the legislative function, he earnestly believed that judges
contributed to the making of the law, and did not just interpret it in the
manner of his continental counterparts. When the Federal Rules of Evidence
were discussed, and ultimately adopted, in the 1970s, they were the
culmination of years of work;2 2 today they are a fundamental component of
federal trial practice. But Judge Friendly was not a fan because he felt that
codified rules could never match the nuances and contextual appropriateness
of judge-made decisions, and would stultify the flexibility and evolution of
the law of evidence. It did not appear to occur to him that many judges,
lacking his erudition, memory, and objectivity-Judge Friendly read
Wigmore on Evidence23 so thoroughly that he virtually had it memorized-
would be helped by having a handy, consistent code of common-sense rules.
What are we to make of this remarkable man, looking back more than
25 years after his death?
On the credenza behind the desk in his chambers, there was a black-
and-white photograph of Justice Louis Brandeis, for whom Henry Friendly
served as law clerk at the beginning of his legal career after graduating from
law school in 1927.24 On it the Justice had scrawled "To Henry Friendly, a
born lawyer." While prescient, these words may understate Judge Friendly's
achievement: he was "born" with prodigious skills, but he became a
masterful lawyer and judge through hard work, passion, an open mind, a high
degree of curiosity, and relentless focus-and, to my mind, with an
unwavering, almost brutal insistence upon intellectual honesty. While we are
unlikely to see his like again, David Dorsen's biography reminds us of the
standards of excellence on which Judge Friendly insisted and the importance
they hold for his profession today.
19. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (1964).
20. Id. at 719-26.
21. David M. Dorsen, Judges Henry J. Friendly and Benjamin Cardozo: A Tale of Two
Precedents, 31 PACE L. REV. 599, 610 n.69 (2011).
22. Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules ofEvidence Advisory Committee:
A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 683 (2000).
23. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (2d ed. 1923).
24. DORSEN, supra note 1, at 27.
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Henry Friendly: As Brilliant as Expected but Less
Predictable
HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS ERA. By David M. Dorsen.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012. 512 pages.
$35.00.
Reviewed by Peter Edelman*
We are fortunate that David Dorsen is Henry Friendly's biographer.
Chronicling the life of a judge, in this case a longtime and hardly flamboyant
private practitioner before he became a judge, could easily yield a product
about which "wooden" would be a compliment. Dorsen is sophisticated,
very smart and very wise, a fine lawyer, and a really good writer. He has
produced a highly readable and truly interesting book. He combines astute
analysis of the voluminous list of cases on which Judge Friendly sat with
perceptive discussion of their political and social context and significance-
both inside the court and in relation to the world outside. It is actually
entertaining.
I was Henry Friendly's third law clerk from 1961-1962, more than fifty
years ago. For a variety of reasons, I did not follow closely his judicial
output or other writings after that time, so for me that portion of Dorsen's
book (which is most of it) was largely new and in many respects fascinating.
The first part of the book covers quite well his family life, with which I was
already quite familiar, and his earlier career as a practicing lawyer. This is
all interesting and important to know to get some idea of Friendly the man
outside the court. But it is when Dorsen turns to the judicial substance that I
find myself enthralled. It was a totally pleasant surprise to discover how
engaging the descriptions and backstories of the cases were.
My experiences as Judge Friendly's law clerk bear out Dorsen's
account, although almost entirely on the positive end of the continuum. He
was rigorous and demanding but seldom if ever short with me in a hurtful
way. I drafted only one opinion, a very short one toward the end of the year,
and I distinctly remember feeling something close to ecstatic when he gave
me the assignment. I had a similar rush earlier in the year when he allowed
me to write a few paragraphs of the opinion in a fairly complicated case.
And now and then he asked me to draft a textual footnote. Yes, those were
special moments, too. Just out of law school, I thought this was how all
judges functioned.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
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Friendly's routine was largely as Dorsen describes. He rarely took more
than a day to write an opinion. At 5:30 or so, ready to embark for home, he
would emerge with a finished draft opinion, at which point (after his
secretary, Mrs. Flynn, typed it) it would be my job to cite-check it.' The
draft often contained citations to old English cases. How did he find them, I
wondered. I knew he didn't have the original cases in his office. Did he
have a secret door or escape hatch in his office from which he could get to a
library that had the cases? There seemed to be two answers. One, he knew
some of the citations by heart, and two, he found the citations in later cases
and cited the earlier originals. Either way, my job was to check his work.
Either way, it was impressive.
Conversations in his office were brief. Whether I was asking or
answering a question or putting forward an idea, the drill was largely the
same. I would get half a sentence out and he would finish my sentence and
then respond. Usually he had grasped instantly and correctly what I was
trying to say. (Remember, he was brilliant, and that's an understatement.) I
would be somewhat at my peril if I wanted to disagree or suggest that he had
not understood what I was trying to say. Mostly he would say gruffly that he
had heard me correctly the first time (although sometimes he hadn't) and
occasionally I would get a second shot.
(A parenthetical note: I had another boss whose modus operandi in
office conversations was exactly the same-Robert Kennedy. Kennedy and
Friendly were poles apart in many ways, but conversations in their offices
about work issues were identical. Just like Friendly, Kennedy would jump in
and finish my question or suggestion and then reply. Getting a second bite at
it was similarly iffy. Notably, Kennedy was brilliant, too, in an especially
intuitive way.)
Dorsen notes that Friendly held grudges and cites one example that
involved me.2 Writing this review gives me a chance to clarify the facts
about that. The story was about Judge Friendly's lobbying Robert Kennedy
through me in 1966 to get him to ask President Johnson to nominate Judge
Edward Weinfeld for a seat on the Second Circuit. The ultimate result was
that the appointment went to then-district Judge Wilfred Feinberg (who has
been an outstanding appellate judge for the better part of fifty years), and
Friendly blamed Robert Kennedy and me for not advocating strongly enough
for Judge Weinfeld.
Friendly was wrong on multiple counts. He had to know full well that
Senators can only suggest court of appeals nominations to the President, as
opposed to the process used for district court appointments when Senators
1. DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE or His ERA 87, 94 (2012).
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from the relevant state are members of the same party as the President.6 And
he should have known that in any event Robert Kennedy and Lyndon
Johnson did not like each other very much, to put it mildly. At Kennedy's
direction, I told Friendly at least twice that Feinberg's brother was a major
donor to Johnson and a personal friend as well, and that Weinfeld should get
the labor leaders, David Dubinsky and Jacob Pitofsky, whom he knew well,
to lobby the President on his behalf. Kennedy did try quite hard to sell the
White House on Weinfeld, and I told Friendly that more than once. When I
had first broached the matter to Kennedy, he said immediately that he felt
badly about having elevated Judge Irving Kaufman instead of Weinfeld some
years earlier when he was Attorney General, and he wanted to rectify the
mistake. I had conveyed this to Friendly as well. Nonetheless, Friendly was
furious at the Senator and me when Judge Feinberg was named to the seat.
I was frankly hurt by this. I did not go to the annual clerk dinners for a
couple of years (I was pretty busy, too), but what Dorsen does not report
(which may be my fault) is that my wife Marian and I invited the judge to the
naming ceremony for our first child, Joshua, in 1969, and he came specially
from New York to Washington to attend. So maybe the grudge was on my
side rather than Friendly's, and quite possibly Friendly's attendance at the
ceremony was his way of apologizing for his anger three years earlier. When
I resumed going to the dinners during the Nixon years, the judge always
called on me along with three or four others to talk about my latest activities.
As Dorsen points out, Friendly strongly valued people who engaged in public
service.
Another personal note, about Friendly's wife Sophie. As Dorsen points
out, my then-wife, Arlyn, and I were invited to dinner fairly frequently
throughout the year that I clerked.7 This was more about Arlyn than it was
about me, because Arlyn was charming in the same kind of way that Sophie
was, and both the judge and Sophie were captivated. Whatever the reason,
we saw Sophie's charm and life spirit firsthand and also got to know the
Friendly children, especially Joan and her husband, Frank Goodman. Sophie
was an extra special person, and we saw the "other" Henry Friendly on those
evenings (which, fortunately, seemed to have a positive effect on our office
relationship as well).
I did not think of Friendly as conservative or liberal when I clerked for
him. I see now that he was in general a moderate conservative in the vein of
John Marshall Harlan. But I didn't have the perspective to understand that at
the time. This was at least partly because the Harvard Law School of the day
enshrined Felix Frankfurter as the model Justice and "neutral principles" as
the reigning judicial philosophy, and discussions of legal issues at Harvard
(at least as I recall) did not articulate issues in terms of conservative or liberal
6. DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34405, ROLE OF HOME STATE
SENATORS IN THE SELECTION OF LOWER FEDERAL COURT JUDGES 1 (2008).
7. DORSEN, supra note 1, at 111.
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values. We were taught that the Roosevelt Court had settled everything both
substantively and in terms of the judicial role.
To me, reflexively, Judge Friendly was the perfect example of the
Harvard idea of the law, although that idea was so ingrained in me that I did
not even articulate to myself that there was a Harvard idea of the law.
(Justice Brennan was a Harvard Law graduate, too, but he had not been on
the Law Review and the "vibe" I felt at the school was that he was not of the
same caliber as Justice Frankfurter. I think this may have been more of an
elitist view than a reflection of a philosophical difference, since my sense is
that in the Harvard world of the day there was not much of a consciousness
about there being such a thing as a liberal versus conservative divide.)
As Dorsen makes amply clear, Friendly was not a down-the-line
conservative. Beyond whatever Harvard Law School had done to shape my
thinking about how to approach the law, I saw Friendly as a person who
looked carefully and thoughtfully for the right answer-certainly for the right
answer on the law but also for the right answer in relation to the facts
presented in individual cases where there was some give in the law.
This is borne out very clearly in the book. The matter of Philip Kerner
is a case in point.8 Kerner had been denied Social Security disability
benefits.9 It would have been easy to affirm the district court's award of
summary judgment to the government. Such outcomes are a daily
occurrence. But Friendly, digging into the case, became convinced that
Kerner was being unjustly treated and that the evidence in the record did not
support the conclusion that Kerner could still perform substantial gainful
activity in the economy and was therefore not disabled.10 Whether Friendly
knew it or not, his legal analysis challenged the routine approach to such
cases. He said "[m]ere theoretical ability to engage in substantial gainful
activity is not enough" and then said "the evidence as to employment
opportunities was even less."" The government must have been
considerably less than pleased at that formulation. If those words had been
in a Supreme Court decision, advocates for the disabled would have been
overjoyed.
But Friendly wasn't trying to make law. He was trying to do justice for
Philip Kerner. He subsequently wrote to a friend that "[t]he way Kerner got
polished off was utterly disgraceful." 2 And then, worried that Kerner would
lose on remand, he reached out to an acquaintance at a cardiac rehabilitation
center to see if he could arrange for Kerner to get medical help. The story
goes on, but what I have already said makes the point. He was quite
susceptible to getting engaged in the equities of the facts of cases about
8. Id. at 174-76.
9. Kemer v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916, 918 (2d Cir. 1960); DORSEN, supra note 1, at 174.
10. DORSEN, supra note 1, at 174-75.
11. See id (quoting from Kerner, 283 F.2d at 921).
12. Id. at 175.
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ordinary people and then walking more than the last mile to pursue a just
result.
Every law student learns about Bivens torts. In Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,'3 the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution creates a cause of action for damages against federal officials
who violate the civil rights of private individuals.14 Friendly's role in the
case is a major example of why it is difficult to pigeonhole him ideologically
and, as well, of his occasional proclivity to act outside of the usual judicial
boundaries. 5
Friendly was sitting as the motions judge one day when he came across
Webster Bivens's motion for leave to appeal informa pauperis. Bivens had
sued for damages after federal officers arrested him in his home without a
warrant and handcuffed him in front of his wife and children.'6 The district
court had dismissed the case, saying what had always been assumed to be the
law: federal officials acting in the performance of their duties could not be
sued in this kind of case.' 7 Friendly, knowing that state officials could be
sued under similar circumstances because of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which had
been enacted in the wake of the Civil War, saw an injustice in the disparity
between the accountability of state officials and federal officials. He
dragooned a recent clerk and by-then Wall Street lawyer, Stephen Grant, to
take Bivens's case.'8
Grant lost. Friendly, who had not been on the panel on the merits,
wrote Grant a brief note suggesting that he "take the matter further."' 9 Then
followed another note suggesting the lines of an argument to make to the
Supreme Court. Grant won. 2 0 Quite a story.
The book is well-stocked with other examples of Friendly's role in
cases that piqued his interest on a human level as well as numerous examples
of his significant role in cases that went on to the Supreme Court. He
became a prolific writer of important books and articles on an array of legal
matters, and of letters, sometimes for publication, expressing views on issues
of the day. As with his work on the court, he was far from predictable,
although there were certainly areas in which he had clear conservative views.
He not only had an open mind across a spectrum of issues, but was willing to
change his position on thinking about it more. Baker v. Carr,2' decided
while I was Judge Friendly's clerk, is an example. I remember the outrage
13. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
14. Id at 395-96.
15. DORSEN, supra note 1, at 183-85.
16. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389-90.
17. Id. at 390.
18. See DORSEN, supra note 1, at 183-84 (discussing how Grant initially stated that he was not
a litigator but that Friendly ultimately assigned Grant to represent Bivens).
19. Id at 184.
20. Id
21. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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he expressed to me about the decision, and I knew that he had written to
Justice Frankfurter, calling his dissent "magnificent" and "one of your truly
wise and great opinions." 2 2  I thought at the time that his anger was
misplaced and was interested to note in Dorsen's book that Friendly changed
his mind about the case a few years later and said so publicly.23 I was glad to
see that, both in itself and for what it says about the man.
In an age in which moderation is increasingly rare in the conservative
world, both judicially and politically (realms that increasingly overlap),
Henry Friendly is a man to remember with special respect. Had he sat on the
Court, I am sure I would have disagreed with many, although far from all, of
his opinions and votes, but I know I would have respected his reasoning and
scholarship. He was a man of reason, above all.




LIBERTY'S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY. By John D.
Inazu. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2012.
288 pages. $55.00.
Reviewed by Ashutosh A. Bhagwat*
After a long period triggered by 9/11 and the Bush Administration's
response to it, when constitutional law was focused on issues such as
executive power and the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment is back in
the forefront of judicial and academic attention. In the past several years, the
Supreme Court has issued a series of important, even path-breaking,
decisions focused on the scope and limits of the freedom of speech.' At the
same time, academic attention has turned to the role that First Amendment
freedoms, including freedoms other than free speech, play in our society.
Important examples include Timothy Zick's Speech Out of Doors,2 which
discusses the relationship between assembly, expression, and public places3
and Ronald Krotoszynski's Reclaiming the Petition Clause, which examines
the role that the Petition Clause of the First Amendment can play in modern
politics.5 We have also seen a flurry of recent law review articles examining
the rights of association and assembly, and their relationship to democratic
self-governance.6 These are, in short, exciting times for those interested in
First Amendment freedoms and their place in the constitutional order.
* Professor of Law, U.C. Davis School of Law. Thanks to Ben Strauss for excellent research
assistance and to Ralph Mayrell and the staff of the Texas Law Review for inviting me to write this
Review.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (holding that an act
criminalizing false claims to military medals was a violation of free speech); Snyder v. Phelps, 131
S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (holding that nondisruptive antihomosexual picketing outside a funeral
was protected free speech); Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741-42 (2011)
(holding that an act prohibiting sales of violent video games to minors was a violation of free
speech); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010) (holding that an act criminalizing
the creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty was overbroad and therefore facially
invalid under the First Amendment protection of speech); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding that political speech may not be suppressed "based on the
corporate identity of the speaker").
2. TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN
PUBLIC PLACES (2009).
3. Id. at 5-6, 21-24.
4. RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS LIBEL,
"OFFENSIVE" PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES (2012).
5. Id. at 14-19.
6. See generally, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978 (2011)
(arguing that First Amendment rights are interrelated mechanisms that serve to advance democratic
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John Inazu has jumped into this ferment with his book Liberty's Refuge:
The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly.7 Liberty's Refuge is an excellent book
with a dual agenda: one part descriptive and one part normative. The focus
of the book is the right, delineated in the First Amendment, "of the people
peaceably to assemble."8 Inazu begins by tracing the central role that the
right of assembly played historically in political struggles and in public
perceptions of the First Amendment, through the middle of the twentieth
century.9 He then traces the gradual transformation of the right of assembly,
explicitly listed in the text of the Constitution, into a nontextual right of
"association" during the 1940s and 1950s, what he calls "the national
security era,"' 0 as well as the narrowing of the right of association, combined
with the complete abandonment of assembly as an independent right during
the period beginning in the early 1960s, which he dubs "the equality era.""
These chapters constitute the descriptive, historical part of Liberty's Refuge,
and they tell a novel and fascinating story. Inazu concludes, however,
normatively, by making the case for the revival of freedom of assembly as a
robust, independent constitutional right that will provide substantial
protection to the internal composition and dynamics of groups. He argues,
referring to several Supreme Court cases, that the modern right of association
fails to provide such protection and criticizes this development as
inconsistent with both the history and the purposes of the First Amendment.' 2
self-government); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People: Legal Regulation and American
Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2011) [hereinafter El-Haj, Changing the People] (describing the
extensive role of assembly and association in nineteenth-century elections and politics); Tabatha
Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543 (2009) [hereinafter El-Haj,
Neglected Right] (characterizing public demonstrations as historically being integral to American
democracy and describing the narrowing of the right of assembly today); John D. Inazu, The
Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565 (2010) (discussing the importance of the
right to freedom of assembly to democracy through a historical account of the right); John D. Inazu,
The Strange Origins of the Constitutional Right of Association, 77 TENN. L. REV. 485 (2010)
(describing the underpinnings of the right of association and its relationship to basic notions of
democracy). This recent scholarly explosion builds on earlier work examining association, from
both a legal and social science perspective. See generally MARK E. WARREN, DEMOCRACY AND
ASSOCIATION (2001) (examining the interplay between associational life and democracy);
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998) (highlighting the individual and civic values
of associational freedom in liberal democracies); Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of
Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119 (2000) (discussing the balance
between freedom of association and nondiscrimination in response to a case holding that the Boy
Scouts had the right to dismiss a homosexual scout leader under the freedom of association); Jason
Mazzone, Freedom's Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639 (2002) (describing how freedom of
association promotes popular sovereignty); Katherine A. Moerke & David W. Selden, Associations
Are People Too, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1475 (2001) (describing essays that address the limits on
freedom of association and the relationship of the government with religious associations).
7. JoHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY'S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. INAZU, supra note 7, ch. 2.
10. Id. ch. 3.
I1. Id ch.4.
12. Id. at 144-49.
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Finally, Inazu concludes by setting forth a "theory of assembly," which he
argues would restore the freedom of assembly to its rightful place.13
There is much to admire in Liberty's Refuge. The history that Inazu
recounts, and the story of doctrinal transformation that he tells, are
fascinating and well worth the read. In addition, Inazu sets forth a
compelling argument that the modem association right has failed in its
primary purpose of protecting the group autonomy that must exist for
effective democratic self-governance. I agree with much of what Inazu has
to say in this regard. In Parts I and II of this Review I will summarize
Inazu's thesis in more detail, pointing to its strengths as well as highlighting
a few areas where I disagree. In Part III, I turn to another issue, which I
believe is raised by aspects of Inazu's argument though not particularly
explored, which is the relationship between the freedom of assembly and
other provisions of the First Amendment. In particular, I look at the problem
of religious groups and their role as "associations" or "assemblies" protected
by the First Amendment. I ask whether the religious character of a group has
any implications for the types of protection it receives and what the interplay
might be between the assembly and association rights, and the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, in addressing this question. The
relationship between the association right and the Religion Clauses came to
the fore in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,14 but has not been much
explored in the literature. In these brief pages, I hope to begin that
conversation.
I. The Gradual Demise of Assembly
At the heart of Liberty's Refuge lies a historical narrative. In these
chapters, John Inazu recounts the central role that freedom of assembly
played in American politics and culture from the Revolutionary Era through
the 1940s, and then describes the decline and eventual disappearance of
assembly in constitutional and political discourse. This part of the book is a
tour de force, weaving together historical, legal, political, and intellectual
developments in a way that is both compelling and highly digestible even to
those without a deep background in either constitutional history or political
science. This historical story itself makes Liberty's Refuge well worth the
read.
Inazu's story begins with the drafting history of the Assembly Clause in
the First Congress in 1789.t5 His description is extremely illuminating for a
number of reasons. First, it leaves no doubt about the widespread agreement
among the founding generation of the significance of the assembly right,
13. Id. ch. 5.
14. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
15. INAZU, supra note 7, at 22-25.
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despite the fact that the protection of assembly (unlike the petition right with
which it is paired, on which more later) had no clear precedent in English
law.16 Inazu traces this consensus to that generation's knowledge of and
sympathy with the travails of the famous Quaker (and founder of
Pennsylvania) William Penn in his struggles with the religious establishment
of England. 17 Notably, Inazu emphasizes that this history supports the
proposition that the Framers understood the assembly right to fully
encompass religious gatherings.' 8
Second, Inazu's drafting history clears up an important ambiguity about
the scope of the assembly right resulting from the language of the First
Amendment. The relevant text reads, "Congress shall make no law . ..
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." 9 Prominent scholars, including Jason Mazzone, have read the
syntax of this closing portion of the Amendment to link assembly and
petition, so that what the Constitution protects is a right of the people to
assemble but only for the purpose of petitioning the government for a redress
of grievances.20 Inazu convincingly refutes this reading. He points out that
the original proposals and drafts of what became the First Amendment stated
two distinct rights: a right of the people "to assemble and consult for their
common good," and a right to petition for a redress of grievances.2 The
language of the "common good" was eventually dropped, but not in order to
narrow the assembly right or link it to petitioning; instead, it was dropped to
ensure that the reference to the common good was not invoked to try and
narrow the range of protected assemblies.22 In short, Inazu argues, the
history of the Assembly Clause reveals a desire on the part of the Framers to
23protect a right that is fundamental and extremely broad in scope.
From drafting history, Inazu proceeds to a broad summary of the role
that the assembly right played in American political history in the century
and a half following the First Amendment's ratification in 1791. The history
is a fascinating one, rich and eye-opening. It encompasses such seminal
moments as the debate over the Democratic-Republican Societies of the
1790s,24 the use of public meetings as a form of democratic activism in the
16. James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American
Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 330 & n.185 (1990).
17. INAZU, supra note 7, at 24-25.
18. Id. at 25.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. Mazzone, supra note 6, at 713-16.
21. INAZU, supra note 7, at 23.
22. Id. at 22-24.
23. See id. at 25 ("The text handed down to us thus conveys a broad notion of assembly in two
ways. First, it does not limit the purposes of assembly to the common good.. . Second, it does
not limit assembly to the purposes of petitioning the government.").
24. Id. at 26-29.
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Jacksonian era,25 the efforts of southern states to suppress assemblies of
slaves and free blacks throughout the antebellum period,26 and the embracing
of public assemblies in the North during this period by both the abolitionist
and burgeoning women's rights movements. 7 Moreover, the right of
assembly continued to play a central role in social movements well into the
twentieth century, including the suffrage movement, the Civil Rights
movement, and (most importantly) the radical labor movement epitomized
by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).28 The story Inazu tells about
the importance of public assemblies to American politics throughout this
period is, as I said, an engrossing one, and one which opens up a whole new
perspective on the nature of American democracy before World War 11
inaugurated the modern era of suburbanization, disaffection, and national
interest groups. If there is any criticism to be made of this part of Inazu's
story, it is that it is incomplete. Because Inazu's primary focus (as we shall
see) is on the postwar era and the decline of assembly, he fails to explore in
depth a number of other episodes during the pre-modern era where
associations and assemblies played an important part in political
developments. 29 But this is a minor point--on the whole, Inazu successfully
conveys the cultural significance of assembly in American democracy up to
World War I, and his narrative sets the stage nicely for the heart of his story.
That story begins to take off when the Supreme Court enters the stage in
the Red Scare prosecutions of the 1920s.30 As Inazu notes, the interwar
period was an odd one for the right of assembly. On the one hand, scholarly
and political defenses of the right of assembly continued and if anything
increased.' On the other hand, the actual right of assembly was subject to
unprecedented restrictions as part of, first, the federal government's efforts to
silence critics of American involvement in World War I, and then, second,
Red Scare suppression of communist movements.3 2  And throughout this
period the Supreme Court consistently failed to provide any meaningful
protection to dissident groups. Indeed, as Inazu discusses, in the seminal
25, Id. at 29-31.
26. Id. at 30-33.
27. Id. at 33-35.
28. Id. at 44-48.
29. See, e.g., El-Haj, Neglected Right, supra note 6, at 554-55 (discussing street meetings in the
early Republic); id at 561-69 (describing the liberal legal regime governing public assembly
through most of the nineteenth century); Mazzone, supra note 6, at 642-44 (discussing women's
clubs in nineteenth-century America); see also El-Haj, Changing the People, supra note 6, at 40-51
(highlighting the wide variety of festive street politics that persisted well into the nineteenth
century).
30. See INAZU, supra note 7, at 50 (quoting Justice Brandeis's famous concurring opinion in
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
3 1. See id at 49 (noting that libertarian interpretations of the First Amendment and political
references to free speech and assembly increased during the interwar years).
32. Id. at 49-50.
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case of Whitney v. California,33 a majority of the Court opined that Anita
Whitney's decision to assemble with the Communist Party was more
dangerous and less worthy of protection than the speech of individuals.3 4
Justice Brandeis's seminal separate opinion, joined by Justice Holmes, did
provide robust protection for free speech and assembly rights,3 ' but it
received only two votes out of nine.36
Whitney v. California probably represents the nadir of First Amendment
rights in the Supreme Court and in the nation as a whole. As a consequence
of the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as President in 1932 and the
enactment of his New Deal by a transformed Congress, the political tone of
the country changed dramatically in the 1930s (these changes were
themselves, of course, a product of the social upheaval triggered by the Great
Depression). Political support for assembly rights, especially for labor
organizers, expanded greatly in this period. And in 1937, in De Jonge v.
Oregon,39 a majority of the Supreme Court wholeheartedly embraced the
idea of extending assembly rights even to those meeting under the auspices
of the Communist Party.40 The Court confirmed this view soon thereafter in
Herndon v. Lowry,41 and most significantly, in 1939 a plurality of the Court
endorsed the idea that the people have a right to assemble even on publicly
owned land such as streets and parks.42 The public rhetoric of this period,
some of which was triggered by the Hague v. C10 4 3 litigation, saw the
freedom of assembly enshrined in popular culture as one of the "Four
Freedoms" underlying American democracy, co-equal with religion, speech,
and the press.4 4 As late as 1945, the Supreme Court was still according
vigorous protection to the freedom of assembly, that time in the labor
context.45 Freedom of assembly, it would seem, had fully and finally taken
its place at the center of our political liberties.
33. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
34. Id. at 372.
35. Id (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Bhagwat, supra note 6, at 983-84 (noting the central
role that assembly and association rights played in the Whitney case even though it is generally cited
as a case about free speech).
36. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
37. See INAZU, supra note 7, at 51-52 (discussing the changes in political and labor rhetoric
concerning assembly during the 1930s).
38. Id.
39. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
40. Id at 364-66.
41. 301 U.S. 242, 263-64 (1937).
42. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
43. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
44. INAZU, supra note 7, at 54-58.
45. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539-40 (1945) (finding that a Texas statute requiring a
union official to obtain an organizer's card as a condition precedent to union activity is an
unconstitutional restraint upon petitioner's rights of free speech and free assembly).
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As it happens, things turned out otherwise. Within little more than a
decade, freedom of assembly as a separate right was in decline, and within
forty years, it had largely been interred. Telling the story of how this
happened, and tying these legal developments to the larger political and
intellectual history of the postwar era, constitutes the core of Liberty's
Refuge and Inazu's most original contribution to our understanding of the
First Amendment.
What happened to the freedom of assembly? In broad terms, Inazu
argues, what happened was that assembly was "swept within the Court's free
speech doctrine.' " The specific path by which this occurred, however, has
much to do with the rise of another, nontextual constitutional right: the right
of association. As Inazu notes, the rise of the associational right in the
Supreme Court in the 1950s is closely tied to two developments:
McCarthyite persecution of communists and Southern persecution of civil
rights activists.47 It was in reviewing various legislative and executive
attacks on communists that the Court first began to refer to a "right of
association" implicit in the Constitution, albeit in the early days generally to
reject the right.4 8 But by 1957 the Court had relied on an association right in
at least two cases to place limits on the power of the federal and state
governments to punish mere affiliation with the Communist Party. 49 In
discussing the McCarthy-era cases, Inazu makes much of what he sees as a
doctrinal division among the Justices, between those (notably Justices
Douglas and Black, but also Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren) who
favored an incorporation approach, which rooted the associational right in
the First Amendment as incorporated against the states in the Fourteenth
Amendment, and those (notably Justices Frankfurter and Harlan) who
favored a liberty approach, which rested on the Fourteenth Amendment alone
with no particular reference to the First.s0 Inazu's view seems to be that the
association right would have been more secure if it had firmly been linked to
the First Amendment. In light of later developments, I am somewhat
unconvinced of the significance of this now largely defunct doctrinal division
and find this part of Inazu's doctrinal story therefore less convincing. But in
any event, the main point is that the McCarthy-era cases set the stage for the
46. INAZU, supra note 7, at 63.
47. See id. at 64 (noting that the "primary political factor" in the rise of the associational right
was "the historical coincidence of the Second Red Scare and the Civil Rights Movement").
48. Id. at 65-73.
49. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50 (1957) (holding that placing a professor
in contempt for refusing to answer questions regarding his knowledge of the Progressive Party
constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of his right to associate with others); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952) (holding that a statute requiring certain state employees to
take an oath regarding their membership in or affiliation with certain proscribed organizations was
unconstitutional).
50, INAZU, supra note 7, at 71-77.
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next key step in the Court's jurisprudence in this area: its seminal 1958
decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.5
The issue in the Patterson case was whether the State of Alabama could
require the NAACP-the preeminent civil rights organization in the nation-
to disclose its membership lists, 52 despite the fact that public disclosure of
NAACP membership would undoubtedly have subjected members to
economic and even physical retaliation. The Supreme Court unanimously
held that it could not, because mandated disclosure violated NAACP
members' "right to freedom of association."53 Importantly, as Inazu notes,
the majority opinion (by Justice Harlan) begins by citing the De Jonge and
Thomas cases, and giving a nod towards freedom of assembly.54 The opinion
then proceeds, however, to rest primarily on a right of "association," a word
55that does not appear in the Constitution. Moreover, the opinion ends up
quite ambiguous about the link between the associational right and the First
Amendment, including the Assembly Clause in particular.56 Nonetheless, the
right of association had definitively arrived, and in subsequent cases
involving both the NAACP and communists, the Court continued to
recognize a right of association while remaining obscure about its source and
scope (and continuing to favor civil rights claimants while disfavoring
communist claimants). 7
By the mid-1960s, the transformation of the textual assembly right into
a nontextual association right was largely complete. As Inazu acknowledges,
however, this transformation need not have had significant substantive
implications. There was no apparent reason to believe that "association"
would prove a narrower right than assembly, and as Inazu also notes,
scholars of this period, while recognizing the doctrinal developments, did not
generally attribute much significance to them.58 It is at this point that Inazu
makes what to my mind is his most valuable contribution to our
understanding of legal change. Inazu does so by tying doctrinal changes in
the Court's jurisprudence to the broader intellectual climate, and in particular
the rise to dominance in the postwar period of pluralist political theory as
epitomized by the work of Robert Dahl.59 At its heart, the pluralist vision of
American society was an extremely positive and optimistic one, envisioning
society as constituted by a harmonious balance among interest groups,
51. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
52. Id. at 451.
53. Id. at 462.
54. Id. at 460; INAZU, supra note 7, at 81.
55. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460 ("It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.").
56. See id. (recognizing "the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly").
57. INAZU, supra note 7, at 84-93.
58. Id. at 94-96.
59. Id. at 96-114.
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mediated through the democratic process.60 Far from being dirty words, such
as Madison's "factions" and modem "special interests," pluralistic interest
groups were the vehicles through which citizens could meaningfully
participate in politics.6 1  This vision seemed a natural response to state-
centered fascism, but also to excessive individualism. It provided a logical
intellectual foundation for the protection of associational rights, since interest
groups had to be permitted to organize and exist in order to play their proper,
benevolent role in society. But in the assumptions underlying pluralism lay a
grave threat. As Inazu perceptively emphasizes, pluralist theory accepted the
legitimacy only of groups which themselves accepted the basic premises of
American democracy. 62 Groups outside of that broad consensus had no
useful role to play, and so could even be suppressed. Inazu argues
convincingly that this view "was bereft of either authority or tradition in
American political thought," 64 and certainly his earlier history of public
assemblies bears out this view. In particular, the pluralist vision of groups
operating within a consensus completely ignores the role that groups can play
in resisting the "tyranny of the majority," in Tocqueville's words. 5 And
though the influence of pluralist theory declined in response to the turbulence
of the Vietnam War era, its impact on the rights of association and assembly,
Inazu argues, continued.
These developments bring Inazu to the final chapter in his historical
story (though not in Liberty 's Refuge): what Inazu calls the "transformation
of association" into a narrow and stunted right, and the concomitant
abandonment of assembly as an independent right altogether. To understand
the arc of Inazu's story, it is useful to begin where Inazu ends, with his bate
noire, the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Christian Legal Society Chapter
of the University of Calfornia, Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez
(CLS). CLS is a complicated case, raising issues too convoluted to fully
60. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 132-33 (1956) (arguing that a
foundational consensus among political participants necessarily underlies a functioning democratic
system).
61. See id at 137, 145-46, 150-51 (1956) (arguing that "(a] central guiding thread of American
constitutional development has been the evolution of a political system in which all the active and
legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process
of decision").
62. INAZU, supra note 7, at 105-06.
63. Id
64. Id at 106.
65. Id at 114.
66. See id at 116 ("[T]he largely unquestioned pluralist consensus that gave the Court its
baseline for acceptable forms of association in the late 1950s and early 1960s opened the door for
the egalitarianism that emerged in the 1970s and placed certain discriminatory associations beyond
its contours.").
67. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). Full disclosure: I was a member of the faculty at U.C. Hastings
College of the Law, the defendant in this litigation, both when the events at issue occurred and
during the litigation. 1, therefore, of course personally know all of the individuals on the
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explore here.68 Briefly, however, the case arose when U.C. Hastings College
of the Law, a public law school located in San Francisco, denied "registered
student organization" status to a student organization consisting of Christian
students.69 The reason was that the organization, the Christian Legal Society
or CLS, required its members and officers to sign a "Statement of Faith,"
which among other things stated adherence to certain Christian doctrines and
also condemned sexual activity outside of heterosexual marriage. 70 Hastings
concluded that these provisions discriminated against potential members on
the basis of religion and sexual orientation, and so violated a Hastings policy
which required student organizations to accept "all comers"--i.e., any
student who wished to join.7 The Court, by a 5-4 vote, upheld the Hastings
policy. 72 Crucially, the Court's analysis focused almost entirely on free
speech doctrine; the majority explicitly declined to analyze separately CLS's
"freedom of association" claim, concluding that it had little independent
significance because, in essence, from the majority's perspective CLS's
association rights only had significance in so far as they were linked to its
speech rights.7 How could this have come to pass, where a claim by a
private group to control its own membership would be analyzed as a free
speech issue, with association relegated to secondary status and the freedom
of assembly not even mentioned? It is this doctrinal (and cultural)
transformation that Inazu traces and seeks to explain, once again telling a
compelling and complex story.
The trigger for the "transformation" of the associational right was the
birth of what Inazu calls the "equality era," with the enactment of key civil
rights legislation in 1964, as well as judicial decisions in the 1960s
interpreting Reconstruction-era legislation to bar private racial dis-
crimination. Until these developments, the significance of association to
civil rights was to protect the autonomy of civil rights organizations such as
the NAACP. 75 With the enactment of legislation banning private dis-
crimination, however, associational rights potentially became a barrier to
civil rights, if private groups could successfully invoke associational rights to
resist racial integration. This problem first came to the Court in 1976 in
defendants' side and indeed many of the plaintiffs as well. I did not, however, have any personal
involvement in those events.
68. For a fuller examination of the litigation and its implications, see generally Symposium, The
Constitution on Campus: The Case ofCLS v. Martinez, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 499 (2011).
69. CLS, 130 S. Ct. at 2980-81.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2978, 2995, 2998, 3000.
73. Id. at 2984-86; see INAzU, supra note 7, at 147-48.
74. INAZU, supra note 7, at 120-21.
75. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (holding that the
NAACP was protected under the Fourteenth Amendment to pursue its "lawful private interests
privately and to associate freely with others").
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Runyon v. McCrary.76 The primary holding in that case was that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 barred racial discrimination in admissions by a private,
nonsectarian school.n Along the way, however, the Court also rejected an
associational claim raised by the school, though on grounds that were
doctrinally far from clear.78 Runyon was nonetheless significant in clarifying
that ideologically motivated, private discrimination could be regulated
consistent with the right of association.79
The key, next step in the evolution of association, and the foundational
case for modem association analysis, is Roberts v. United States Jaycees.80
At issue in Roberts was whether the Jaycees, a national organization
dedicated to "promoting the interests of young men,"8' had a constitutional
right to exclude female members, in violation of state law.82 The Court held
(unanimously) that it did not.8  In analyzing the Jaycees' associational claim,
Justice Brennan's majority opinion draws a critical distinction between two
rights of association: a right of "intimate association" protected by the Due
Process Clause,84 and a right to associate for expressive purposes (since
described as a right of "expressive association") 5 protected by the First
Amendment. 86 The majority (reasonably) found no intimate-association
issue because the Jaycees are not an intimate group even on the most
generous definition.87 Its rejection of expressive association, however, was
more problematic. The Court held that the purpose of expressive association
was solely to protect associations who advance expressive goals, and because
the inclusion of women into the Jaycees would not "impede the
organization's ability to ... disseminate its preferred views," there was no
constitutional violation.88 In one fell swoop, the Court completed the process
of converting what had been a freestanding, textual right of assembly into a
nontextual and ancillary right of association for expressive purposes. It
should be noted that this transition occurred even though the Court rooted
this right squarely in the First Amendment (suggesting that Inazu's concerns
76. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
77. Id, at 172-74.
78. INAZU, supra note 7, at 123-24.
79. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176 (stating that the freedom of association protects the right of
parents "to send their children to educational institutions that promote the belief that racial
segregation is desirable, and that the children have an equal right to attend such institutions. But it
does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also
protected by the same principle.").
80. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
81. Id. at 627.
82. Id. at 612.
83. Id. at 612, 631.
84. Id. at 617-18.
85. Id.; INAZU, supra note 7, at 135-40.
86. INAZU, supra note 7, at 135-40.
87. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-21.
88. Id. at 618, 627.
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about "incorporation" versus "liberty" may be off the mark).89 The difficulty
was that instead of focusing on "assembly," the Court focused on "speech" as
the source of the associational right.
What intellectual forces produced this truncation of a formerly hallowed
right? The pernicious influence of pluralism may have been the root cause,
but Inazu traces the specific intellectual impetus to "The Rise of Rawlsian
Liberalism."" In Inazu's view, the form of liberalism associated with John
Rawls's Theory of Justice, as expounded by later writers including notably
Ronald Dworkin, built on pluralism by tying pluralist visions of harmony
with specific commitments to equality and regard for others. 9' This
predisposition, Inazu suggests, naturally led lawyers and judges inculcated
with the liberalism of the 1970s (including Justice Brennan) to prioritize
equality principles over the autonomy of dissenting groups. 92 1 must confess
that unlike Inazu's pluralism story, which I find quite persuasive, his
discussion of Rawlsian liberalism leaves me a bit cold. There is no doubt
that Rawls and Dworkin represent a particular form of moderate-left
thinking in the United States of the 1970s and 1980s. But were they, and
especially legal thinkers like Dworkin, really shapers of opinion? Or were
they merely rationalizers for a liberal consensus that was the outgrowth of
the Civil Rights Movement and other social movements? Just as much of
liberal jurisprudential writings from that period seem designed primarily to
defend Roe v. Wade, one wonders if the embrace of equality over liberty was
similarly designed to provide intellectual justification for a fait accompli-
the legislative and judicial achievements of the civil rights era.
In any event, as Inazu points out, the Roberts reformulation of
association has largely been adhered to since 1984." The primary exception
is Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale,94 in which the Court upheld the right of the
Boy Scouts to exclude a gay assistant scoutmaster on the somewhat forced
theory that inclusion of a gay assistant scoutmaster would interfere with the
Boy Scouts' ability to express a message of hostility to homosexuality,
thereby violating the Scouts' right of expressive association (the result
would, of course, have been much easier to defend on a pure assembly or
association theory).95 But CLS retreated to some extent from that position;96
89. See INAZU, supra note 7, at 74-75 (discussing the differences between the incorporation
argument and the liberty argument).
90. Id. at 129-32.
91. See id at 129 ("Pluralist political thought insisted on a consensus bounded by shared
democratic values; Rawlsian liberalism presumed an 'overlapping consensus' in which
egalitarianism rooted in an individualist ontology trumped and thus bounded difference.").
92. See id ("Like the pluralist assumptions that preceded them, the Rawlsian premises of
consensus and stability pervaded political discourse and influenced the ways in which the equality
era reshaped the right of association.").
93. Id at 142 (discussing N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) and
Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987)).
94. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
95. Id. at 655.
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and in any event, given the confusions inherent in the expressive association
doctrine, it remains far from clear what the exact scope of the Dale decision
was and how it could be reconciled with Roberts. So for now, association
remains a truncated right, limited to facilitating speech, and as Inazu notes,
"The Court ... has not addressed a freedom of assembly claim in thirty
years."97
II. Inazu's Theory of Assembly
Inazu's historical story of doctrinal evolution ends with, as he sees it,
the evisceration of any form of substantial group-autonomy rights in CLS.
CLS, however, is in Inazu's view not where the Court went truly wrong; it is
instead the predictable fallout from earlier errors. The key error, Inazu
argues, was the Court's reformulation in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees of the
association right into dual, narrow rights of intimate and expressive
association.98 This left a gaping hole in protection of group rights. Intimate
association protects small familial (and perhaps family-like) groups; and
expressive association protects groups that are directed at speech (and
perhaps other First Amendment activities such as petitioning the government
or the exercise of religion). 99 But what about other groups, which are not
familial in any meaningful sense and also not primarily expressive, but which
nonetheless provide a critical space within which citizens can jointly develop
their values and their capacity for self-governance? The Roberts
reformulation, Inazu convincingly argues, leaves little or no protection for
the internal autonomy of such groups, and therefore, leaves them at the
mercy of tyrannical democratic majorities. 00
Enter assembly. The core of the normative argument in Liberty's
Refuge is that the time is ripe for a reinvigoration of the textual right of
assembly in order to cure the deficiencies of the modern association doctrine.
Inazu takes the position that interpretative theory fully supports a turn back
to assembly as the key source of group rights. 101 He also convincingly
demonstrates that the history of group rights in this country fully supports a
right of autonomy of dissenting, nonconformist groups, 102 contrary to views
of scholars such as Andrew Koppelman who argue that the "right to
discriminate" recognized in Boy Scouts v. Dale was an historical
96. See generally CLS, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (deciding the case on other grounds, but noting
that U.C. Hastings could condition the Christian Legal Society's status as a registered student
organization on its acceptance of persons of all religious beliefs, even though one of the Society's
purposes was to express solely Christian beliefs).
97. INAZU, supra note 7, at 62.
98. Id at 135.
99. Id. at 140.
100. Id. at 135-41.
101. See id. at 5 (arguing that "[r]ecovering the vision of assembly remains an urgent task").
102. See id. at 4 (arguing that the four principles of the history of assembly collectively counsel
for the protection of groups "that dissent from majoritarian standards").
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aberration. 03 The Assembly Clause would, Inazu argues, protect dissident
groups as well as nonexpressive social and religious groups in a way that
association fails to do.
In addition to his interpretative and historical arguments, Inazu also
presents a political theory of assembly, drawing upon the work of Sheldon
Wolin105 as a counterweight to the consensus-driven narrative of Dahlian
Pluralism and Rawlsian Liberalism.o 6 It is necessary, he argues, to protect
dissenting and political assemblies, groups that reject certain consensus
norms on a nonnegotiable basis, and that seek to engage in a form of politics
outside of the accepted politics of state institutions.107 Inazu also asserts that
recognizing a vibrant assembly right will advance expressive goals, curing
some of the shortcomings of expressive association by recognizing the
variety and complexity of the ways in which groups can be expressive.'0o As
I have argued elsewhere, I find this last argument less convincing.'0 9 It
seems to me that one of the great advantages of supplementing "expressive
association" with the textual right of assembly is precisely that it rejects the
pernicious idea that groups deserve protection only to the extent that they are
expressive. Even nonexpressive social and religious groups contribute to the
goals of the First Amendment by protecting and advancing democratic self-
governance in critical ways, "o and so lie fully within the coverage of the
First Amendment. To emphasize the expressive nature of assemblies might
undermine this critical point. At bottom, however, this is a relatively minor
point of disagreement. There is no doubt that Inazu fully accepts the view
that nonexpressive groups are entitled to constitutional protection,"' and so
103. Id. at 162-66 (discussing ANDREW KOPPELMAN WITH TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A
RIGHT To DISCRIMINATE? HOW THE CASE OF BOY ScoUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE WARPED THE LAW
OF FREE ASSOCIATION (2009)).
104. Id. at 150-53.
105. Id. at 153-56 (discussing SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY AND
INNOVATION IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (2004)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 156-60.
108. Id. at 160-62.
109. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Liberty's Refuge, or the Refuge of Scoundrels?: The Limits of the
Right of Assembly, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1381, 1383-84 (2012) (arguing that Inazu's emphasis on
the expressive nature of assembly undermines the argument that the Assembly Clause is an
"independent and co-equal" First Amendment right, and that assembly "should be protected not
because it is expressive, but because it independently advances the goals of the First Amendment").
For Professor Inazu's response to my critique, see John D. Inazu, Factions for the Rest of Us, 89
WASH. U. L. REv. 1435, 1436 (2012) (replying that the emphasis on the inherent expressiveness of
assembly was intended as a critique of the doctrinal distinction between expressive and
nonexpressive associations and reaffirming that assembly is valuable because it facilitates "dissent,
self-governance, and the informal relationships that make politics possible").
110. For a more detailed discussion of the link between groups and democratic self-governance,
see Bhagwat, supra note 6, at 991-99.
111. See Inazu, supra note 109, at 1436 ("[Tlhe expressive potential of a group is not the reason
that we value assembly.").
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the space between his views and mine are primarily a question of rhetoric
and emphasis.
Inazu concludes by setting forth in full-blown form his theory of
assembly. He defines assembly as "a presumptive right of individuals to
form and participate in peaceable, noncommercial groups." 1 l2 By adopting
this broad view, Inazu seeks to avoid the limitations of the Roberts approach,
and to affirm that the assembly right is a stand-alone right of group autonomy
and not merely a handmaiden to other First Amendment liberties. But,
inevitably, Inazu also is forced to recognize limits on the scope of assembly.
The definition itself restricts protection to peaceable groups, a limitation
which he acknowledges raises difficult boundary questions," 3 and excludes
commercial groups.l14 Finally, and most significantly, Inazu excludes from
protection groups which "prosper[] under monopolistic or near-monopolistic
conditions."'115 As examples of such groups, he cites the famous Jaybird
Association, which was the subject of the Terry v. Adams"'6 litigation, and a
hypothetical student group "providing exclusive access to elite legal jobs."", 7
Inazu urges a "contextual analysis," focused on "how power operates on the
ground," in applying this exception," but ultimately he is clear that it is a
narrow one. Inazu is a bit unclear about exactly why he would deny
coverage to such "monopolistic" groups, but presumably the reason is that
the social harm caused by the exclusion from such groups of individuals
subject to discrimination outweighs the value of protecting the assembly
right in such contexts.
All of the above points to some important questions raised but not
answered by Liberty's Refuge. There is no question in my mind that Inazu's
arguments do a great service in pointing out how ahistorical and theoretically
problematic the Roberts reformulation and narrowing of group rights really
was. I am also willing to accept Inazu's premise that this damage can be
undone by resurrecting the textual assembly right from its premature
demise-though one is left uncertain at the end of Liberty's Refuge why the
same goals might not be accomplished by a broadening of the association
right. Perhaps the answer lies in some combination of the fact that the
doctrinal damage done by Roberts is at this point too entrenched to be
reversed, and that the textual roots of assembly makes it a better repository
for a stand-alone right of group autonomy.
112. INAZU, supra note 7, at 166.
113. Id. at 167. For a discussion of the ambiguities surrounding the exclusion of violent
assemblies, see Bhagwat, supra note 109, at 1389-92.
114. INAZU, supra note 7, at 167.
115. Id. at 166.
116. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).




The unanswered questions raised by Liberty's Refuge concern Inazu's
concept of dissenting political assemblies. Dissent is at the heart of the
concept of assembly endorsed by Liberty's Refuge. And for Inazu, the
quintessential example of a dissenting assembly is the Christian Legal
Society, denied the right to define its own membership in CLS. But why is
CLS a "dissenting" group? Certainly, in the doubly liberal environment of a
law school located in San Francisco, a conservative Christian group opposed
to homosexuality qualifies as "dissenting," in the sense of being out of the
mainstream politically and socially. But similar groups, located in many,
many social contexts in many, many parts of this country would fit
comfortably in the mainstream, and it is LGBT groups that would be
"dissenting." In those contexts, is defending the right of groups such as the
Boy Scouts, unless they are "monopolistic," to exclude homosexuals truly
advancing "dissent"? Similarly, consider the United States Jaycees. The
Jaycees are a highly regarded, national group with a great deal of prestige. Is
such a group, or the Rotary International (a defendant in similar litigation),
truly a "dissenting" group, requiring judicial protection of their right to
exclude women against a hostile, tyrannical majority? There is something
distinctly odd about this picture.
This raises an even more basic question: why should we favor group
autonomy even at the expense of other social values such as equality and
social peace? That we have historically done so is a good starting point, but
it does not provide a fully satisfactory answer, especially in light of the fact
that we as a society have quite consciously and properly distanced ourselves
from many of the exclusionary practices of the past. Inazu argues that the
reason is to ensure that our society retains a true pluralism, rooted in
differences in fundamental values." 9 Moreover, despite the capaciousness of
Inazu's theory and his commitment to group autonomy (which I do not for a
moment question), the actual instances of conflict that he discusses in recent
years overwhelmingly involve religious groups and values. I close my
discussion by briefly considering why that might be so, and what a
particularized focus on religious assemblies teaches us about assembly,
association, and the role of the state. Lurking in the background here are two
provisions of the First Amendment, the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses, which get very little notice in Liberty 's Refuge, but which I suggest
may deserve more attention.
II. The Elephant in the Room: Religious Assemblies and the Religion
Clauses
At the heart of Liberty 's Refuge is a normative claim that for reasons
both historical and theoretical it is important to grant constitutional
119. See id. at 11 (arguing against the political theory of consensus liberalism underwriting
weakened group autonomy and resulting in the loss of meaningful pluralism).
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protection to the internal autonomy of dissenting, nonconformist groups.
Inazu is also clear about the sorts of groups that he has uppermost on his
mind. One such group, as noted earlier, is the Christian Legal Society.
Another group Inazu mentions is the Chi Iota Colony of the Alpha Epsilon Pi
(AEPi) fraternity.12 0 AEPi is a national social fraternity for Jewish college
men, and the Chi Iota Colony was seeking to become an AEPi chapter at the
College of Staten Island.12' The college denied Chi Iota's request to be
granted official recognition (and access to funds) because Chi Iota refused to
admit women.12 2 Chi Iota sued, but was unsuccessful because both its
intimate and expressive association claims were weak.12 3 Finally, Inazu
clearly believes that the Supreme Court was correct in Boy Scouts v. Dale in
upholding the Boy Scouts' right to exclude a gay assistant scoutmaster.
What do these groups have in common? On its face, it is the desire to
exclude others. But that cannot be the end of it. Inazu, for example, seems
quite sympathetic with the Court's decision in Runyon rejecting a private
school's right to racially discriminate in admitting students.124 Instead, CLS,
the Boy Scouts, and, to a lesser degree, Chi Iota appear sympathetic because
of the ideological, and in particular religious and moral, underpinnings of
their actions. CLS is of course an explicitly religious organization, and the
Boy Scouts themselves, even though not sectarian, clearly root their beliefs
and actions in religious values-which is why the Scouts exclude not only
homosexuals, but also atheists.12 5 Chi Iota is the least obviously religious of
these groups, but even its Jewish identity has a clear religious element-
though Inazu tellingly suggests that Chi Iota's claim may well have been hurt
by the fact that "[a]lthough [Chi Iota's] Jewish roots suggest religious
freedom interests, most of its members were nonpracticing Jews." 26 The
plain implication is that an explicitly religious group's claims would (or
should) be even more persuasive than Chi Iota's.
Nor is Inazu's concern with religiously oriented groups idiosyncratic.
There was a time, in the McCarthy and Civil Rights eras, when associational
rights were claimed primarily by nonconformist political groups such as the
Communist Party, the NAACP, and other civil rights organizations. Later,
during the 1970s and 1980s, associational issues arose in the context of
eliminating race and gender segregation. In today's world, however, the
battles over association, assembly, and group autonomy focus primarily on
120. Id at 144-45.
121. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 142
(2d Cir. 2007).
122. Id
123. Id at 149 & n.2.
124. INAZU, supra note 7, at 123.
125. See Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego, 530 F.3d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining
that the Boy Scouts "maintain that agnosticism, atheism, and homosexuality are inconsistent with
their goals and with the obligations of their members").
126. INAZU, supra note 7, at 145.
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religion. One line of cases pits religiously oriented groups seeking to
exclude others on the basis of either religion or sexual orientation against
state nondiscrimination policies.127 In another line of cases, disputes have
arisen over attempts by religious groups to meet-i.e., to assemble--on
public property' 28 or to obtain access to public benefits.' 29
127. See, e.g., CLS, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010) (pitting a law school chapter of the Christian
Legal Society with membership requiring a statement of faith against the school's all-comers
nondiscrimination policy); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (placing the Boy
Scouts of America, which maintained a policy against homosexuality, agnosticism, and atheism,
against New Jersey's public accommodations law); Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 637-41
(9th Cir. 2008) (pitting a school Bible Club seeking to exclude nonbelievers against school district's
nondiscrimination policy), overruled on other grounds by L.A. Cnty. v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447
(2010); Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 857-58 (7th Cir. 2006) (pitting a Christian
student organization seeking to exclude homosexuals against a university nondiscrimination policy);
Hsu ex rel. Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1996) (placing
a high school Bible club seeking to exclude nonbelievers against the school's generally applicable
nondiscrimination policy).
128. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102, 107 (2001) (finding a
school's exclusion of a Christian children's club from meeting after hours at school, based on its
religious nature, to be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-95 (1993) (finding a school district violated the First
Amendment by denying a church access to school premises to exhibit film series on family and
child-rearing issues); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264-67 (1981) (finding a public university
could not prohibit a registered religious group from use of university facilities which were generally
available for use by other registered groups); Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y.,
650 F.3d 30, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2011) (reversing an injunction against the city board of education and
school district, which had excluded a church from religious worship practices on school grounds);
Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 902, 918-19 (9th Cir. 2007)
(reversing a preliminary injunction against a county excluding a religious nonprofit organization
from holding worship services in the public library meeting room); Donovan ex rel. Donovan v.
Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 214 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding a public high school's
denial of permission for a religious club to meet on school premises during student activity period
constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of First Amendment); Fairfax Covenant Church v.
Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 17 F.3d 703, 704 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding a regulation allowing a school to
charge churches an escalating rate for use of school facilities discriminated against religious speech
in violation of the First Amendment); Grace Bible Fellowship v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 5, 941
F.2d 45, 47-48 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that by allowing other organizations to use facilities for
expressive activities, the school district created a public forum from which it could not bar a
religious organization); Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1369 (3d Cir. 1990)
(allowing a religious group to conduct activities, not limited to those of a secular nature, in a high
school auditorium).
129. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23, 845-46
(1995) (holding that a state university's refusal to fund the printing of religious student publications
while funding nonreligious publications violated the right to free speech); Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (holding that taxpayer-ftinded reimbursements for parochial school students'
bus fares do not violate the First Amendment); Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 776-
78 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that a public university's funding of student-group programs where
prayer sessions occur does not violate the Establishment Clause); Rocky Mountain Christian Church
v. Bd. of Cnty. Comn'rs, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1180 (D. Colo. 2009) (holding that the equal-terms
provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, as applied, does not violate
the Establishment Clause); Every Nation Campus Ministries at San Diego State Univ. v.
Achtenberg, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1078-79 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that a public university's
refusal to formally recognize Christian student groups that refuse to comply with the
nondiscrimination policy does not violate the groups' First Amendment rights); Roman Catholic
Found., UW-Madison, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1133 (W.D.
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And even outside of the courtroom, the most prominent modem
examples of groups claiming autonomy and the right to choose their
membership selectively also tend to involve religious groups. It is, for
example, inconceivable (and of course illegal) for any significant commercial
entity to exclude women from leadership positions, and even most
noncommercial entities appear to have admitted women since the battles of
the 1980s.130 Yet it remains true that major religious sects, including the
Catholic Church,' Orthodox Jewish congregations,132 and the Mormon
Church,"' continue to exclude women from the clergy. In short, in the
modem world, the epitome of the "dissenting, political" assembly that Inazu
seeks to defend is the religious assembly.
It is also worth noting that the linkage between assembly-or for that
matter speech-rights and religion is not merely a modem one. In Liberty 's
Refuge, Inazu himself points to the importance of the tradition of religious
nonconformity associated with William Penn and Roger Williams in helping
to develop American ideas of free expression and assembly.13 4 He also notes
that during the actual debates in the First Congress over the Assembly
Clause, a specific reference was made to the English prosecution of William
Penn for holding a religious assembly of Quakers which did not comply with
the strictures of the established Church of England.'35 Elsewhere, Inazu has
more explicitly explained and explored the religious roots of the very term
"assembly," noting that going back to the early Christian era the term (and
its Greek predecessor ekklesia) always had political and religious
connotations.16 Similarly, Akhil Amar has noted that during the antebellum
era among abolitionists "the core right of assembly at issue seems to be the
right of blacks 'to assemble peaceably on the Sabbath for the worship of [the]
Wis. 2008) (holding that the Establishment Clause does not compel a public university to
categorically refuse funding for a student group's "worship, proselytizing or sectarian religious
instruction").
130. Including in 1991 the epitome of the "Old Boys Club," the Skull and Bones secret society
at Yale, though not without a fight. Dennis Hevesi, Shh! Yale's Skull and Bones Admits Women,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1991, at 21; see also Yale Alumni Block Women in Secret Club, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 1991, at B2 (reproducing an AP report that the Skull and Bones society "obtained a court
order temporarily blocking the all-male club from admitting women").
131. Ryan W. Jaziri, Fixing a Crack in the Wall of Separation: Why the Religion Clauses
Preclude Adjudication of Sexual Harassment Claims Brought by Ministers, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV.
719, 721 n.17 (2011) (citing MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD vs. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE
OF LAW 190 (2005)).
132. Ilana S. Cristofar, Blood, Water and the Impure Woman: Can Jewish Women Reconcile
Between Ancient Law and Modern Feminism?, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 451, 462
(2001).
133. Elisabeth S. Wendorff, Employment Discrimination and Clergywomen: Where the Law
Has Fearedto Tread, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 135, 140 (1993).
134. INAZU, supra note 7, at 12-13 & 13 n.28.
135. Id. at 24-25.




Creator."" 37  There is thus good precedent for the modem centrality of
religious groups and religious speech in First Amendment disputes.
When one recognizes the central role that religious groups play in
modem association/assembly disputes, however, a conundrum arises: why do
these cases typically turn on the Speech and Assembly Clauses of the First
Amendment, and the related right of association, rather than on the First
Amendment provisions which expressly address religion-the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses? One might think that these provisions, whose
very purpose is to protect religious autonomy, would provide greater
protection to religious groups than the generic rights of assembly or
association. But that is not the case. The Christian Legal Society did in fact
join a Free Exercise claim to its primary speech and association claims in the
CLS litigation, but the Court dismissed the argument in a casual footnote,
citing its decision in Employment Division v. Smith' for the proposition that
because Hastings' "all-comers" policy was a generally applicable rule that
did not target religion, it raised no free exercise issues.'3 9 Nor is the CLS
decision an aberration in this regard. Lower courts have also relied upon
Smith to conclude that the Free Exercise Clause grants less protection to the
associational rights of religious groups than does expressive association.14 0
Decisions such as CLS would seem to suggest that the Religion Clauses
play second fiddle to speech, assembly, and association claims by religious
groups. The truth, however, is rather more muddled, as demonstrated by the
Supreme Court's recent, important decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC. The issue in Hosanna-Tabor was
whether the First Amendment created a "ministerial exception" to
antidiscrimination statutes, which shielded religious institutions from
antidiscrimination claims brought by ministers and other employees (the
litigation arose when a teacher at a religious school brought a lawsuit under
the Americans with Disabilities Act). 14' The Court held that the Religion
Clauses required such an exemption.14 2 The government and the plaintiff
argued to the Court that instead of turning to the Religion Clauses, the Court
should look to the right of association as the source of any such exemption,
but the Court rejected this argument as "untenable," and indeed,
137. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 245 (1998)
(quoting JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 124-25 (1965)).
138. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
139. CLS, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2995 n.27 (2010) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-82).
140. Salvation Army v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs of N.J., 919 F.2d 183, 194-96 (3d Cir. 1990);
Wiley Mission v. N.J. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, CivilNo. 10-3024, 2011 WL 3841437, at *13 (D.N.J.
Aug. 25, 2011); Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Port of Portland, Or., No. CV04695HU, 2005 WL 1109698,
at *15 (D. Or. May 5, 2005).
141. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 700-01,
705-06 (2012).
142. Id. at 705-06.
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"remarkable." 43 The difficulty with this argument, the Court said, was that it
would grant religious organizations no more autonomy than secular
associations, and that was inconsistent with the fact that the First
Amendment, through the Religion Clauses, "gives special solicitude to the
rights of religious organizations."144 In other words, the Hosanna-Tabor
Court read the Religion Clauses as granting religious associations greater
protection than the general association right. And again, there are lower
court cases consistent with this view.145
Consider the CLS and Hosanna-Tabor cases, which were decided less
than two years apart. Both involved attempts by religious groups to exclude
individuals-in CLS from membership and in Hossana-Tabor from
employment. In both instances, the exclusion was religiously motivated.
Yet CLS was litigated primarily, and unsuccessfully, as a freedom of
association/free speech case, while Hosanna-Tabor was litigated successfully
as a religion case. Hosanna-Tabor was a unanimous decision, and while the
Court divided sharply in CLS, not even the dissenting justices invoked the
Religion Clauses as a basis for protecting CLS's autonomy. This is not to
say that the results in the two cases are necessarily inconsistent. CLS was
different from Hosanna-Tabor in that it did not involve a flat attempt by the
State to regulate a religious entity. It involved only denial of official
recognition and benefits (including funding and use of government property),
and everyone seemed to acknowledge that the government could not have
simply required CLS to admit members it wished to exclude. But the
question does remain why in one case the Religion Clauses provided
powerful protection for religious autonomy, while in the other they were
brushed off as irrelevant. And more generally, the question raised by these
cases is whether the religious nature of an association matters in determining
the level of constitutional protection to which it is entitled.
It should be noted, moreover, that the uncertain lines between the
Religion Clauses and the rest of the First Amendment are not limited to the
associational context, In a separate line of modern cases, the Supreme Court
has analyzed exclusion of religious groups from public property or public
benefits as a species of viewpoint discrimination, violating the Free Speech
Clause.' 4 6 As my colleagues Vik Amar and Alan Brownstein have pointed
out, however, this move and the concomitant failure of the Court to analyze
these cases under the Religion Clauses is highly problematic and raises
nontrivial questions about the general viability of laws banning
143. Id at 706.
144. Id
145. See, e.g., Irshad Learning Ctr. v. Cnty. of DuPage, 804 F. Supp. 2d 697, 717-18 (N.D. Ill.
2011) (holding that the allegations adequately alleged that the county violated free exercise rights
under the First Amendment and the Illinois Constitution).
146. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107-12 (2001); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-46 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-96 (1993).
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discrimination on the basis of religion.' 47 The truth is that while the Court
pays occasional attention to the relationship between speech and religion, at a
systematic level it seems blissfully unaware of the complexities here.
A full answer to these difficult questions is far beyond the scope of this
Review, even limited to the problem of association. Any exploration,
however, must begin with the question that, as I noted earlier, is largely
elided in Liberty's Refuge: Why the First Amendment protects group
autonomy, and for that matter, religious freedom. Part of the answer, Inazu
suggests, lies in the need to protect dissent, including moral and religious
dissent. I think, however, that this can only be part of the answer. Another
part of the answer must lie in distrust of the state. The Constitution is, after
all, at heart a structural document, and the limitations it places on state
power, including those in the Bill of Rights, reflect structural concerns about
misuse of that power. And those concerns are in turn rooted in the need to
ensure that the sovereign people remain in charge of their government.148 In
other words, dissent is valuable precisely because it is an essential
component of popular sovereignty and democratic self-governance. The
scope of constitutional protection for assemblies and associations turns not
on general principles regarding the proper role of private groups in our
society, but rather on the appropriate relationship between such groups and
the state.
Here, I think, is where the limits of freedom of association, or as Inazu
would have it the Assembly Clause, become apparent. If the issue we are
exploring is the proper relationship between religious groups and the state,
those bodies of law are unlikely to provide useful answers because they do
not distinguish between religious and other groups. But religion is different,
a point that the Constitution recognizes in the Religion Clauses, especially
the Establishment Clause. Exactly how religious assemblies differ from
secular ones, however, is far from easy to pin down. Perhaps Hosanna-
Tabor is correct in suggesting that government interference in the internal
structure of religious groups is more constitutionally problematic than
interference in secular groups. But on the flip side, it is also true that
governmental benefits flowing to religious groups raise difficult
constitutional questions that benefits to secular groups do not. This is not to
say that the inclusion of a group like CLS in a general, neutral scheme of
governmental benefits such as the Hastings Registered Student Organization
program would violate the Establishment Clause-under current doctrine it
147. Alan Brownstein & Vikram Amar, Reviewing Associational Freedom Claims in a Limited
Public Forum: An Extension of the Distinction Between Debate-Dampening and Debate-Distorting
State Action, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 505, 537-39 (2011).
148. For more detailed examinations of these themes, see generally AMAR, supra note 137
(chronicling the changing interpretation of the Bill of Rights throughout history) and ASHUTOSH
BHAGWAT, THE MYTH OF RIGHTS: THE PURPOSES AND LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
(2010) (arguing that the primary purpose of constitutional rights is to restrict governmental power,
thereby maintaining the proper structural balance between individuals and the state).
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almost certainly would not.'49 But such benefits can raise difficult problems,
especially if they come with conditions. Consider the fact that governments
regularly condition benefits or funds on recipients agreeing to restrict their
conduct in particular ways, including commonly surrendering the right to
discriminate.150 No one seems to seriously believe that such conditions
generally raise constitutional concerns. But what about when the recipient is
a religious organization? I would posit that at a minimum we should be
concerned about such state intrusion into the inner workings of religious
groups, even if we would not be concerned about secular groups, and that the
source of such concerns is not the Assembly Clause of the First Amendment
but the Religion Clauses.
149. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652-53 (2002) (holding that a program,
which provides tuition aid for students to attend participating public or private schools of their
choosing, does not offend the Establishment Clause, even though governmental aid reaches some
religious institutions indirectly through the program); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46 (holding
that a public university does not violate the Establishment Clause when it provides funding for a
wide range of student organizations, even if some are religious organizations).
150. See, e.g., Education Amendments of 1972 §§ 901, 904, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1684 (2006)
(barring discrimination based on sex or blindness); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006) (barring age-based discrimination); Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504,
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006) (barring disability-based discrimination); Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (barring discrimination based on "race, color, or national origin");
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Introduction
I recall driving to work one day several years ago and listening to a
radio program on which listeners were invited to call in and test their basic
knowledge of the First Amendment. The challenge was to name four of the
freedoms listed in the First Amendment, or alternatively to identify the last
names of four characters from the animated television show The Simpsons. It
was a small sample, to be sure, but to both my amusement (as a commuter)
and horror (as someone who teaches and writes about the First Amendment)
every caller was far more successful naming Simpsons characters than
identifying First Amendment freedoms.
As I recall, not a single caller mentioned the right "peaceably to
assemble."' After reading John Inazu's book, Liberty's Refuge: The
Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, the reasons for this collective memory loss
are clearer. As Inazu explains, the freedom of assembly has languished in
exile for many decades. Inazu takes the reader on the Assembly Clause's
fateful journey, from its prominence in the early republic, 2 to its 1939 New
York World's Fair glory, to its eventual desuetude.4 He expertly recounts
how historical, political, intellectual, and jurisprudential forces transformed a
seemingly clear constitutional guarantee into an also-mentioned right that
occasionally plays second fiddle to freedom of speech. Inazu complains that
the once-venerable "freedom of assembly" has been eclipsed and replaced by
a judicially constructed, and doctrinally constricted, freedom of "expressive
association."5 As Inazu notes, the Supreme Court has not explicitly based a
decision on the Assembly Clause in three decades.6
In Liberty's Refuge, Inazu ably comes to assembly's defense. His
account sheds new light on the history and constitutional metamorphosis of a
* Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
2. JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY's REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 29-34
(2012).
3. Id. at 55-57.
4. Id. at 61-62.
5. Id. at 2-3.
6. Id. at 62.
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critical but now largely forgotten First Amendment freedom. That alone
makes the book well worth reading. However, there is much more in the
book than exegesis and excavation. Inazu seeks not only to rediscover
assembly, in the sense of explaining what happened to it, but also to recover
it in a manner that gives it contemporary relevance and force. He argues that
a robust freedom of assembly ought to protect the formation, composition,
and expression of groups. Inazu makes some provocative claims, in the best
sense of that term. He pushes back against prevailing equality norms and
principles that tend to cast groups like the Boy Scouts of America and the
Christian Legal Society as illiberal villains.8 He forces readers to grapple
with some uncomfortable questions regarding the limits of group autonomy
in a liberal democracy. He asks whether a truly robust freedom of peaceable
assembly ought to shelter even some racially exclusionary groups.9
I share Inazu's desire to return the freedom of peaceable assembly to
something like its former glory. In Liberty's Refuge, however, Inazu's focus
on the rise of expressive association and its relation to a few notable groups
dominates the analysis to such an extent that the full import of a rediscovered
freedom of assembly may remain somewhat obscured. My principal
suggestion is that we try to recover assembly in the fullest and most robust
possible sense. To that end, although I will make some critical observations,
my Review will also clarify and amplify several of Inazu's central claims. If
we can think of the Assembly Clause as an artifact or relic, Inazu has
unearthed and exposed it to the light of day. While praising this effort, I
want to suggest how we might pull the Assembly Clause fully from the
ground.
Part I describes Inazu's account of the freedom of assembly and his
central claims. In Part II, I address some concerns regarding interpretive
methodology and the substantive implications of the book's principal focus
on illiberal and potentially dangerous assemblies. Part III focuses on some of
the positive, personal, and public aspects of freedom of assembly, which
receive somewhat limited attention in the book. Part IV concludes with a
discussion of the implications of a fully recovered right of assembly for
traditional forms of public protest, demonstration, and dissent.
7. See id. at 2 ("The central argument of this book is that something important is lost when we
fail to grasp the connection between a group's formation, composition, and existence and its
expression.").
8. See id at 168-72 (arguing that the protections of assembly should apply to groups like the
Boy Scouts and the Christian Legal Society).
9. See id at 13 (noting that one of the most difficult issues in balancing the right of assembly
with antidiscrimination laws "is whether the right of assembly tolerates racial discrimination by
peaceable, noncommercial groups").
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I. Recovery and Refuge
In Liberty's Refuge, Inazu presents compelling historical, intellectual,
and jurisprudential narratives in order to further two primary goals. First, he
seeks to recover the right to peaceable assembly by tracing its roots and
explaining its eventual transformation into a right of expressive association.
Second, Inazu articulates a theory of freedom of assembly under which the
First Amendment would provide greater refuge to various aspects of group
autonomy and liberty.
Inazu begins his examination with what, in retrospect, was clearly
assembly's halcyon period. As Inazu explains in Chapter 2, in the early
republic citizens routinely invoked and exercised the freedom to peaceably
assemble by joining together in societies, civic organizations, public
marches, religious rituals, and community festivals.10  In a fascinating
historical account, Inazu demonstrates that the freedom of peaceable
assembly has deep social, political, and constitutional roots. He describes
how society members, abolitionists, women's suffrage proponents, labor
agitators, and civil rights activists all invoked the freedom to peaceably
assemble." Inazu effectively narrates assembly's glory days as one of the
"Four Freedoms" celebrated at the 1939 New York World's Fair and as a
constitutional freedom touted by public figures and the general public.' 2
Chapter 2 ends, rather abruptly, with a very brief discussion of what Inazu
refers to as the "demise of assembly."1 As Inazu notes, "by the end of the
1960s, the right of assembly in law and politics was largely confined to
protests and demonstrations."' 4 By the early 1980s, even this aspect of the
right of assembly had been subsumed by First Amendment free speech
doctrine.' 5
As Inazu observes, the merger of freedom of assembly and freedom of
speech tells only part of the story. Something more momentous and
transformative occurred with regard to the Assembly Clause. In Chapters 3
and 4, Inazu demonstrates that during what he calls the "National Security"
and "Equality" eras the freedom of assembly was transformed into a right of
association.16 These chapters represent the heart of Inazu's volume and offer
its most intriguing insights.
10. Id. at 29-30.
11. See id. at 34-44 (describing the abolitionists' use of assemblies and noting that during the
Progressive era, the women's movement, the labor movement, and African-Americans all invoked
the freedom of assembly).
12. Id. at 55-57.
13. Id. at 61-62.
14. Id. at 61.
15. See id at 62 ("[Elven cases involving protests or demonstrations could now be resolved
without reference to assembly.").
16. Id. chs. 3, 4.
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Most scholarly attention has focused on the path of freedom of speech
during these critical eras. As Inazu explains, however, during these periods
the right of individuals to assemble in pursuit of common causes was directly
challenged by government and ultimately legitimized in the courts.' 7 Inazu
carefully examines the political, jurisprudential, and theoretical factors that
led to the transformation and eventual interment of assembly. In Chapter 3,
he points to the intersection of anticommunist sentiment and the civil rights
movement, doctrinal disagreements among Supreme Court Justices, and the
influence of pluralist political theorists like Robert Dahl.18 In Chapter 4, he
highlights civil rights activists' challenges to segregationists' claims for
group autonomy, the development of the constitutional right to privacy, and
the rise of Rawlsian liberalism.' 9
Inazu's central claim is that the combination of these influences
produced a weak associative right based upon principles of liberal
congruence and consensus. It is difficult to gauge the degree of influence
that political events and philosophers have on the process of constitutional
interpretation. The right of expressive association appears to have been
constructed through a type of common law constitutional interpretation.20
Having first (wrongly) tethered the right of assembly to the right to petition
and later ventured into the realm of constitutional privacy, the Supreme
Court eventually arrived at the nontextual and ancillary (to speech) right of
association. Nonetheless, in terms of the substance of expressive association
Inazu's political and theoretical narratives support his conclusion that the
right the Court ultimately recognized "depoliticizes and disembodies
expression in order to neutralize dissent."2' Inazu characterizes the
association right as an "enfeebled" version of assembly that restricts group
autonomy, suppresses dissent, and pushes groups toward conformity and
congruence.22 In sum, he argues that the "forgetting of assembly and the
embrace of association . . . marked the loss of meaningful protections for the
dissenting, political, and expressive group."23
As part of his restorative project, in Chapter 5 Inazu articulates a
"political theory of assembly." 24 He finds intellectual support for this theory
in the work of Sheldon Wolin. Wolin criticized Rawls and other consensus
17. See, e.g, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (protecting the
NAACP from state scrutiny of its membership lists).
18. INAZU, supra note 2, at ch. 3.
19. Id. at ch. 4.
20. See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (arguing that many
areas of constitutional doctrine, including freedom of speech, developed according to common law
methods and principles).
21. INAZU, supra note 2, at 155.
22. Id at 4.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 153-57 (citing SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY AND
INNOVATION IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (2004)) (discussing Sheldon Wolin's scholarship).
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theorists for demonizing dissent and disagreement and for falsely equating
conformity and politeness with civic reasonableness.2 s Wolin argued that
dissent, social conflict, and nonconformity are necessary destabilizing
components of a healthy democracy.26 With Wolin and against pluralist and
liberal theorists, Inazu argues for a conception of assembly "that resists the
state's push for consensus and control." 27 Inazu claims that robust protection
for group autonomy allows individuals to create distance between individuals
and the state. Rather than having democracy's substance and limits dictated
by a monist state, he argues that assembly empowers groups to experiment
with various democratic forms and practices.2 8 Inazu's political defense of
group autonomy offers a strong counternarrative to that relied upon by
antidiscrimination proponents (most notably Andrew Koppelman).2
Although he anticipates that a variety of civic, religious, and other
groups would benefit from a recovered freedom of assembly, Inazu is
particularly concerned with extending protection to groups that act or wish to
act contrary to what is commonly perceived to be the "common good."3 0 As
Inazu envisions it, a robust freedom of assembly would provide "strong
protections for the formation, composition, expression, and gathering of
groups, especially those groups that dissent from majoritarian standards."3'
Although he discusses other aspects of group autonomy, Inazu focuses
primarily on protection for group membership decisions. Thus, according to
Inazu's account, the biggest losers in the gradual disappearance and
transformation of assembly into expressive association are groups that resist
or fail to comply with pluralist and liberal norms relating to inclusion and
equality.32 Throughout the book, Inazu focuses primarily on groups like the
Jaycees, the Boy Scouts (who have recently affirmed their policy against
openly gay Scouts or adult Scout Masters), the Christian Legal Society, and
all-male fraternities.34 Invoking equality principles and antidiscrimination
laws, plaintiffs and governments pressed such organizations to open their
doors to all comers." Courts have mainly, although not uniformly, held that
25. See id at 154-56 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) and WOLIN, supra
note 24) (discussing theories of Dahl, Rawls, and Wolin).
26. Id. at 156.
27. Id at 162.
28. Id at 5-6.
29. Id at 162-66.
30, Id. at 152-53.
31. Id
32. See id. at 171 (arguing that under one popular theory of expressive association, "every
group that challenged antidiscrimination law" would be subjugated to the state if the state
determined that "discrimination is central to the group's core expression").
33. Erik Eckholm, Boy Scouts to Continue Excluding Gay People, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/us/boy-scouts-reaffirm-ban-on-gay-members.html? r-0.
34. INAZU, supra note 2, at 132-46.
35. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 645 (2000) ("The complaint alleged
that the Boy Scouts had violated New Jersey's public accommodations statute and its common law
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antidiscrimination principles trump group autonomy. In contrast, Inazu
envisions a "meaningful pluralism" that countenances "all-male fraternities,
all-male Jaycees, and all-Christian student groups," as well as "all-female
sororities, all-female health clubs, and all-gay social clubs."3 Perhaps most
controversially, Inazu's conception of group autonomy might be broad
enough to grant some First Amendment protection to the exclusionary
policies of some private groups that exclude individuals on the basis of
race.38
Inazu does not address in detail how courts would actually enforce a
recovered right of assembly. He defines it as a "presumptive right of
individuals to form and participate in peaceable, noncommercial groups."39
Inazu briefly considers the textual limitation that is suggested by the
adjective "peaceably." He suggests that this may exclude such things as
"[c]riminal conspiracies, violent uprisings, and even most forms of civil
disobedience."4 0 Inazu also posits a nontextual limitation, namely that
commercial groups are not entitled to protection under the Assembly
Clause.41  For groups that are presumptively protected by the Assembly
Clause, Inazu proposes that courts apply a "contextual" analysis that
considers "how power operates on the ground."42  Where private groups
overreach, as for example when they exercise monopoly power with respect
to certain goods or services, the state may be able to rebut the presumptive
protection afforded under the Assembly Clause. 3 However, in most cases,
Inazu expects that the presumption will prevail against governmental
interference with groups' autonomous decision making.44
Liberty's Refuge is an important contribution to the First Amendment
literature. It provides a thick, careful, and intellectually rigorous account of a
freedom that has languished for too long and which judges, lawyers,
by revoking [the Plaintiffs] membership based solely on his sexual orientation."); Bd. of Dirs. of
Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 541-42 (1987) (seeking an injunction on the
grounds that an international Rotary Club's revocation of one of its members' local charters,
because the local club had admitted women members, violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act).
36. See, e.g., Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 547 (holding that "application of the Unruh Act to local
Rotary Clubs does not interfere unduly with the members' freedom of private association"). But
see, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 659 (holding that the First Amendment prohibits the state from requiring
that the respondent be readmitted to the Boy Scouts through the application of its public
accommodations law, which does not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' right to
freedom of expressive association).
37. INAZU, supra note 2, at I 1.
38. Id. at 14.
39. Id at 166.
40. Id at 167.
41. Id at 167-68. For a critique of this specific limitation, see generally Robert K. Vischer,
How Necessary Is the Right ofAssembly?, 89 WASH. U. L. REv. 1403 (2012).
42. INAZU, supra note 2, at 172.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 169 (arguing that "in almost all cases, the protections of assembly should
prevail").
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scholars, and citizens have paid far too little attention to over the past several
decades. Inazu's book also tells a cautionary tale about constitutional
meaning and textual transformation, and demonstrates the importance of
giving full effect to the entirety of the First Amendment's text. Liberty 's
Refuge does not purport to provide a final answer or set of answers regarding
the scope and limits of the freedom of assembly. Having recovered the
Assembly Clause, Inazu merely points us in the direction of its future
enforcement.
II. Interpreting Assembly
The question of interpretive methodology is an important one,
particularly as it relates to a constitutional provision that has been in exile for
decades. Having mistakenly abandoned assembly, the Supreme Court could
conceivably resurrect it by providing a new substantive account. The recent
treatment of the Second Amendment is instructive in this regard. Inazu's
account raises several interpretive concerns. What sources ought to be
consulted in re-interpreting the right of peaceable assembly? What
justifications are there for adopting a distinctly political theory of assembly
that focuses primarily on protecting the autonomy of dissenting groups?
Should the interpretive model be atomistic, in the sense that it focuses on a
single First Amendment provision, or holistic, in the sense that it synthesizes
assembly and other rights? Finally, does Inazu's primary focus on dissent
and nonconformance risk offering too much protection for illiberal and
violent groups? Although these are serious concerns, I think Inazu has
offered some convincing responses. I want to amplify a bit on those
responses, and to suggest some additional support for them.
A. Eclectic and Atomistic Methodologies
The extent to which the Assembly Clause protects the sort of group
autonomy Inazu identifies is not clear from its text. Perhaps assembly is a
temporal right-meaning that it applies only to temporary groupings or
affiliations, which must remain peaceable for their duration. If so,
longstanding organizations like the Boy Scouts would find no refuge under
the Assembly Clause. Further, we could interpret the requirement that
assemblies be "peaceable" as a requirement that they respect equality rights.
Under this interpretation, peaceable activity is activity that conforms to
certain consensus norms regarding public order and social tranquility. Or, in
terms of external limits, one might argue that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause was intended to modify or limit the First
Amendment's protection for freedom of assembly.
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As noted earlier, Inazu claims that the Assembly Clause ought generally
to protect groups against imposition of consensus norms. 4 5 He argues that
the substantive meaning of the Assembly Clause can be derived in part from
political and philosophical principles of dissent and nonconformity. Is this
theoretical account attractive because it is consistent with the original
understanding? Because it comports with a structural interpretation of the
Bill of Rights? Or is Inazu's interpretation simply the best answer given all
of the available historical and other evidence we have regarding freedom of
assembly?
Inazu acknowledges the importance of interpretive methodology. His
approach is refreshingly transparent. Inazu states that he is using an eclectic
interpretive model, which is to say that no particular methodology (i.e.,
originalism, textualism, living constitutionalism) propels his interpretation of
the Assembly Clause.46 Thus, Inazu engages in a textualist approach when
he renders a close reading of the text and (correctly, in my view) decouples
freedom of assembly from the right to petition government for a redress of
grievances. 4 7  He makes copious use of history, structural arguments,
prudential principles, and various other constitutional "modalities" in
examining the Assembly Clause. Inazu's political theory of assembly is
consistent with these sources; to a large extent, it follows from them.
Eclecticism is a defensible mode of constitutional interpretation.
Indeed, for a rights guarantee like the Assembly Clause that has been
dormant for so long it may be the best method of recovering meaning.4 8 The
freedom of assembly is, as Inazu ably demonstrates, a product of historical,
social, and political events and influences. Its meaning has been forged over
time in the courts, in public debate, in national celebrations, and even in
international diplomacy. Inazu's eclectic and interdisciplinary approach
rightly takes account of all of these contexts and sources.
Given the centrality of group discrimination to his account, Inazu might
have paid somewhat more attention to the intersection of the First
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, he might have
avoided framing the question as one involving a choice between Dahl and
Rawls, on the one hand, and Wolin on the other. We are not actually
choosing among political theorists or political theories, but among plausible
interpretations of constitutional text. However, Inazu's account seems to be
consistent with all of the available historical, structural, and other evidence
relating to the freedom of assembly. He offers substantial evidence to
45. See id. at 155 (arguing, contrary to the view of consensus theorists, that groups with
different, unpopular views should be protected).
46. Id. at 17-19.
47. Id. at 23-25.
48. Cf STRAUSS, supra note 20, at 55 (arguing that "the text and the original understandings of
the First Amendment are essentially irrelevant to the American system of freedom of expression as
it exists today").
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support his interpretation, and suggests reasons to doubt alternative
interpretive accounts-including Andrew Koppelman's historical narrative,
which Inazu claims is incomplete and privileges equality concerns over
group autonomy and liberty.49 In light of all of this evidence, as Inazu
correctly notes, the burden rests on others to come forward with a more
plausible account.
Inazu's interpretive methodology is both eclectic and atomistic. By
atomistic I mean that it focuses intently on a single clause or rights provision
and examines it mostly in isolation from other constitutional text. Other
constitutional scholars, including some who have examined First
Amendment freedoms, have adopted a similar approach.5 0  There are both
benefits and costs associated with this kind of atomistic methodology.
On the considerable plus side, scholars engaging in atomistic
interpretation are able to offer deep historical and intellectual accounts of
constitutional rights and other provisions. By zeroing in on the Assembly
Clause, Inazu is able to offer a granular, detailed, and intellectually thick
account of the right to peaceably assemble. Like eclecticism, atomistic
interpretation may be particularly well suited to contexts in which
constitutional text has been exiled or significantly transformed over time.
On the cost side, atomistic interpretation can lead to a degree of myopia.
Inazu's approach is situated at the opposite extreme from works like Thomas
Emerson's iconic The System of Freedom of Expression.5 1 Emerson treated
the First Amendment's expressive liberties-speech, press, assembly, and
petition-as part of an interrelated system that served core functions such as
individual fulfillment, the search for truth, and self-governance.52 Emerson
incorporated a discussion of the right to peaceably assemble into this
systematic account.53 He interpreted assembly and other First Amendment
rights as protections against regulating belief, coercing orthodoxy, and
insisting on congruence and conformity.54
These are essentially the same core values that Inazu ascribes to the
freedom of assembly. Thus, there is apparently some connective tissue that
49. See INAZU, supra note 2, at 162-66 (citing ANDREW KOPPELMAN WITH TOBIAS
BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE? How THE CASE OF BoYScouTs OF AMERICA V.
JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW OF FREE ASSOCIATION 1-24 (2009)) (summarizing differences
between Inazu's historical narrative and Koppelman's narrative regarding association).
50. The most notable recent example, which examines the First Amendment's Petition Clause,
is RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS LIBEL,
"OFFENSIVE" PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES (2012).
51. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 15 (1970).
52. See id at 6-7 (stating that the system of freedom of expression is an essential means of
assuring individual self-fulfillment, advancing knowledge and discovering truth, and providing for
participation in decision making by all members of society).
53. See id at 286-92 (discussing the vital role that the "various modes of public assembly and
petition play in a modem system of free expression").
54. See id. at 292-388 (discussing rights of peaceable assembly and petition).
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binds the First Amendment's provisions together. One of the weaknesses of
Inazu's atomistic interpretation is that it treats the Assembly Clause as an
island of liberty rather than as part of an interlocking and mutually
supportive system. This makes it more difficult to determine how freedom of
assembly relates to or intersects with other freedoms. Thus we learn from
Inazu's account that "assembly is a form of expression" and that it protects
groups from state-enforced conformity and congruence." What is less clear,
though, is how the freedom of assembly might differ from, support, or
operate within the First Amendment's system.
Atomistic interpretation makes it more difficult to determine what
marks the freedom of assembly as distinctive or unique relative to other
neighboring First Amendment rights. In the context of a public parade or
protest, for example, citizens may be engaging simultaneously in freedom of
speech, petition, and assembly. What, if anything, is distinctive about the
freedom of assembly in this context? What distinguishes it, in either form or
substance, from the rights of expression and petition? Early in his account,
Inazu notes that assembly overlaps with religious freedoms. Indeed, freedom
of assembly's roots can be traced back to the trial of William Penn, a Quaker
who was infamously charged with assembling for religious purposes.5 6 As
Inazu's examples involving Christian campus organizations and Jewish
fraternities show,5 7 in some important respects the connection between
assembly and religious free exercise remains close today. What is distinctive
about the Assembly Clause in the context of religious assemblies? Why
ought it, rather than the Free Exercise Clause, apply when adjudicating
formation and composition questions relating to religious groups?58
Other holistic or synthetic interpretive questions occurred to me as I
read Liberty's Refuge. For instance, might a fully recovered freedom of
assembly correct some of the errors, ambiguities, or weaknesses of free
speech doctrine? The social pressure to conform to majority norms and to
avoid social conflict is quite strong. First Amendment protection for some
anonymous speech offers only a partial antidote to privacy concerns.59 As
Inazu suggests, the freedom of assembly provides refuge from state
interference with group formation.o Perhaps freedom of assembly, rather
55. See INAZU, supra note 2, at 4-5 (highlighting how the right of expressive association
provides strong protection for the formation, composition, expression, and gathering of groups and
enables meaningful dissent from majoritarian standards).
56. Id at 24-25.
57. Id. at 144-45.
58. See generally Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, Assembly Resurrected, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 351 (2012)
(considering the question of how the Religion Clauses should interact with the Assembly Clause).
59. Cf McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 349-53 (1995) (recognizing in dicta
that a state's interest in preventing fraud and libel might justify a limited identification
requirement).
60. See INAZU, supra note 2, at 4 (arguing that the four principles of the history of assembly
collectively counsel for the protection of group formation).
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than or in addition to freedom of speech, provides a substantive basis for
protection against certain forms of state surveillance. If so, then the relevant
First Amendment question would not be whether the state's actions have
"chilled" speech in some tangible way, but rather whether they have
interfered with a private group's autonomy regarding formation and
composition.61
To be clear, I am not suggesting that Inazu's interpretation is
illegitimate because it lacks Emersonian breadth. Like the eclectic model,
the choice to delve deeply and thickly with respect to a right or clause rather
than more holistically or comparatively is a valid interpretive scholarly
choice. Inazu acknowledges that more systematic work must be done. As he
states in the book's conclusion, "if courts were to reaffirm the continued
importance of the freedom of assembly, then they would need to explain its
doctrinal framework and outline the relationship of assembly to other First
Amendment freedoms." 62 But perhaps in this instance what Inazu views as
the cart ought to come before the horse. If we were able to more fully
recover and explain what is distinctive about the freedom of assembly, we
might have more success convincing courts that they ought to reaffirm this
forgotten right.
B. Recovering Assembly's Darker Side
Below I discuss some of the more positive social and political functions
of assembly. In interpreting the Assembly Clause, Inazu's focus is
elsewhere. He is particularly concerned with protecting the membership
decisions of nonconforming groups. This orientation could create the
impression that a recovered right of assembly will be useful primarily to
society's most illiberal and dangerous assemblies. Why recover a right that
benefits mobs and troublemakers? As Professor Bhagwat asks in a recent
symposium contribution, is the freedom of assembly a refuge for
constitutional liberty or a refuge for "scoundrels"? 63  Bhagwat is rightly
concerned that the limits of the freedom of assembly be clearly defined, in
particular with regard to potentially violent groups. Both in the book itself
and in subsequent commentary, 4 Inazu offers some tentative responses to
readers' concerns about assembly's darker side. Here, again, I want to
elaborate on these responses and to offer some additional observations about
the importance of protecting dissent and social conflict as manifested in
61. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) (holding that plaintiffs who objected to U.S.
Army surveillance had not established standing to challenge the data-gathering program because
they had not shown any regulatory effect on their expressive activities).
62. INAZU, supra note 2, at 186.
63. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Liberty's Refuge, or the Refuge of Scoundrels?: The Limits of the Right
ofAssembly, 89 WASH. U. L. REv. 1381, 1381 (2012).
64. See, e.g., John D. Inazu, Factions for the Rest of Us, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1435, 1438-40
(2012) (responding to concerns about the line between peaceable and violent assembly).
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assemblies. In Part III, I will focus on the more positive aspects of freedom
of assembly that receive less attention in Inazu's account.
Inazu argues that freedom of assembly ought to protect against certain
forms of state-enforced orthodoxy. 5 In most cases, the freedom of peaceable
assembly ought to bar coercive attempts by government to control the
internal norms and practices of private assemblies. In a society that
celebrates individualism but generally expects group conformity with regard
to certain social norms and practices, a conception of pluralism that actually
facilitates difference is indeed critically important. Inazu singles out a few
organizations such as the Boy Scouts and the Christian Legal Society, which
have been involved in recent high-profile disputes.66 However, this sort of
protection is also important to a host of other groups. Among these are
American Muslims, Wiccans, Occupy Wall Street protesters, "Birthers,"
conspiracy theorists, medical marijuana advocates, Tea Party members, day
laborers, labor strikers, gun advocates, and other individuals who join
together and share creeds, causes, or conditions that many do not view as
serving the common good.
It is not easy to be a dissenter or a nonconformist in America. That
may strike some as an odd assertion. After all, Americans celebrate
countercultural trends and actions. Indeed, they sometimes make heroes of
nonconformists. However, it is still far easier to get along if one goes along
with prevailing social and political norms. Dissenters and nonconformists
face considerable pressures, both from government regulators and prevailing
cultural forces, to get on board or in line. Members of the dissenting and
other out groups mentioned above can certainly attest to the pressure placed
upon them to conform to majority religious, social, and political norms.
They are frequently labeled discriminators, bigots, outsiders, weirdos,
whackos, whiners, freeloaders, and closed-minded ideologues.68 Whether
they take the form of public protest movements, group memberships, or
fringe causes, dissent and nonconformity can still use all the assistance they
can get. Dissenting and nonconforming groups are not threats to democracy;
65. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Max Abelson, Occupy Plans 'S17' Wall Street Tie-Up, WASH. POST, Aug. 30,
2012, at A3 (detailing plans for a demonstration to mark the one-year anniversary of the Occupy
Wall Street movement, despite challenges posed by protester "burnout," and recounting how
"governments around the world used concussion grenades, gas, riot gear, pepper spray and arrests to
disband camps and protests"); Tina Susman & Andrew Tangel, Protesters March Back to Wall
Street, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, at A8 (noting that more than 180 protesters were arrested during
the one-year anniversary demonstration and describing popular criticisms of the movement for its
"lack of focus" and its "failure to . . . adopt specific issues").
68. See, e.g., Editorial, Occupy Plus One Year, N.Y. POST, Sept. 17, 2012, at 24 (characterizing
Occupy Wall Street protestors as "obnoxious outliers" and a "ragtag assemblage of stragglers,
radicals, moochers, trust-fund sophists, bums, rapists, drug-dealers, petty criminals and cop-car
poopers").
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they are central components of our political and constitutional system. One
of Inazu's signal contributions is to remind us of this easily forgotten fact.
Of course, there is a darker side to freedom of assembly. Some groups
may actually be dangerous. As Professor Bhagwat has observed, a broad
freedom of assembly might facilitate the formation and activities of violent
groups.6 Here, though, we must be careful not to adopt a common fallacy.
During far too many periods of American history, including the current era,
public officials and the public at large have equated assemblies with angry
and destructive mobs. 70 Although his historical account is otherwise thick,
Inazu underemphasizes this part of assembly's narrative.
Groups that reject consensus norms and occupy positions at the fringe
of American culture ought not to be, for that reason alone, considered threats
to national security or public safety. Of course, it is true that as collective
enterprises, assemblies can be more dangerous than individual actors. None
of the individual perpetrators of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
United States could have done as much damage acting alone. Many other
dangerous networks, groups, and associations, including separatists and
neoracists, currently reside in the United States. As Inazu notes, however,
the Assembly Clause protects only "peaceable" forms of assembly. That
clearly excludes individuals who assemble for the common purpose of
engaging in acts of violence. Freedom of assembly offers no First
Amendment immunity or defense for participants in criminal conspiracies
such as the September 11 attacks.
Beyond this point, Inazu has conceded that he "lack[s] a clear sense of
where the peaceability line ought to be drawn."7 1 I do not think this is an
acute problem. With regard to violent conspiracies and the like, as Inazu has
noted, the First Amendment is essentially irrelevant.72 This is true whether
we are talking about freedom of speech or a recovered version of freedom of
assembly. With regard to other out groups that do not intend to or actually
engage in violent activities, the presumption of protection ought to apply. As
I discuss below, the "peaceably" limitation would seem to present the most
acute interpretive difficulties as applied to assemblies engaged in civil
disobedience and other nonconforming, but nonviolent, activities. Even here
the danger of an expansive right of assembly will likely be minimal. The
assemblies at issue are likely to form or act in the open, on public streets and
69. Bhagwat, supra note 63, at 1394-96.
70. See, e.g., Carolyn Jones, Oakland's Top Administrator Tough Enough for City She Loves,
S.F. CHRON., July 8, 2012, at Al (profiling Oakland City Administrator Deanna Santana, who
issued the final eviction notice to Occupy Wall Street protestors in Frank Ogawa Plaza on the basis
of "safety issues," and quoting Santana expressing her concern that "if this place went up in flames,
it'd be on me"); Andrew Tangel, At 1 Year, Occupy's Effect Is Still Hard to Gauge, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2012, at Al ("Polls have shown that the public generally supports Occupy[] [Wall
Street's] message but not its disruptive tactics.").
71. Inazu, supra note 64, at 1438.
72. Id. at 1440 & n.29.
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in public parks where regulations define what is and is not lawful in terms of
public protests and other forms of outdoor social conflict.
Perhaps Inazu's most provocative claim relates not to violent groups but
to private assemblies that engage in racially or ethnically discriminatory
practices. As Inazu forthrightly acknowledges, the suggestion that some
such groups ought to receive refuge under the Assembly Clause is the most
troubling and tentative in his volume.13
I am not sure that we ought to protect the membership and other
decisions of such assemblies-even if we currently allow them to use the
public streets to engage in protest and other forms of expression. I do not
think that it suffices to say, as Inazu has in defending this part of his analysis,
that some degree of overprotection of freedom of assembly follows
ineluctably from the logic of overprotection of freedom of speech.74 The fact
that some offensive and even vile expression is protected as part of the price
for a robust freedom of speech does not necessarily answer the question
whether we ought to protect discriminatory conduct by private groups or
tolerate hateful organizations. Whether the First Amendment ought to
protect degrading and hateful expression remains a matter of significant and
ongoing debate. Further, the Supreme Court's observation that free speech
"may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people
to anger" does not necessarily map well onto the sorts of private decision
making Inazu discusses in the book. The costs of exclusion and the societal
dynamics associated with discriminatory groups may well require a different
calculus and some distinct limitations.
Here, though, is another place where examining the ties to other First
Amendment rights might bear some fruit. Might there be, for example, some
notion of "counter-assembly" under which groups that are offensive to even
the most deeply held societal norms are countered by groups that accept such
norms?77  Single-sex educational institutions compete with coeducational
ones. Groups espousing traditional heterosexual marriage are countered by
numerous gay rights groups. Male-only fraternities coexist on campuses
across the country with female-only sororities. The National Rifle
Association regularly spars with countless gun control groups. And civil
rights groups keep tabs on and challenge racist organizations. Or perhaps we
73. INAZU, supra note 2, at 14.
74. Inazu, supra note 64, at 1437,
75. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012) (arguing for more
regulation of hate speech, contrary to the mainstream position of overprotection).
76. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
77. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (noting that,
except in emergencies, the remedy for exposing falsehoods in speech is more speech, not
repression), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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ought to develop a theory of tolerance that is uniquely related to assembly.78
We might also borrow from the pluralist approach that has developed under
the First Amendment's religion clauses." So long as there are meaningful
rights of entry and exit, and the group has no monopolistic power or
characteristics, the state really ought to remain neutral with regard to the
formation and composition of assemblies. Again, I am not sure that we
ought to provide these or other justifications for protecting the autonomy of
illiberal assemblies. But if we are to do so, more theoretical thought and
effort must be devoted to producing a justification for extending assembly so
far.
Inazu is undoubtedly correct that if the Assembly Clause is revived in
the manner he suggests, we will have to think very carefully about the
amount of breathing space we want to create for certain kinds of assemblies.
In terms of managing this concern, Inazu has cast significant doubt on the
expressive association doctrine. Determining how the problem of invidious
discrimination by groups ought to be resolved under the Assembly Clause is
a matter that requires further reflection.
III. The Forms and Functions of Peaceable Assembly
Liberty 's Refuge offers a compelling argument that institutional
autonomy, in particular with respect to membership decision making, is a
critical aspect of freedom of assembly.80 However, a fully recovered
freedom of assembly would protect a diverse array of groups and would
serve important functions, some of which Inazu addresses only briefly. For
the purpose of amplification, and toward the end of taking assembly's fullest
possible measure, this Part examines more closely the forms and functions of
assembly.
A. Assembly's Diverse Forms
What is an "assembly"? Although Inazu is an otherwise careful
textualist,81 he does not offer a basic definition of this term (as opposed to a
definition of the right of assembly itself). An assembly is "a group of people
gathered together in one place for a common purpose."82 The shared space
78. See generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986) (advancing the theory that societies that are tolerant of
ideas that are legitimately unworthy of protection are strengthened by that tolerance).
79. See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409 (1990) (dicussing the Free Exercise Clause's origins
in religious pluralism).
80. INAZU, supra note 2, at 152-53.
81. For example, Inazu convincingly argues that freedom of assembly and freedom to petition
government for a redress of grievances are independent and freestanding rights. Id at 23-25. Inazu
is also careful to note that "peaceably" limits the scope of the right of assembly. Id at 166-67.
82. NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 95 (2001).
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may be physical or virtual. The common purposes may be social, political,
religious, cultural, or educational. Although he acknowledges other forms,
Inazu focuses primarily on groups or assemblies that are longstanding,
organized institutions. As noted earlier, Inazu's interpretive and normative
accounts treat the primary function of freedom of assembly as preserving
autonomous space for dissenting and nonconforming organizations and
institutions.84
In Chapter 2's historical narrative, Inazu describes an extraordinary
variety of assemblies. He discusses societies, institutions, congregations,
organizations, rituals, feasts, protests, parades, and demonstrations. These
types of gatherings have long been a critical part of American social, civic,
and political culture. Indeed, they remain so today. After describing this
rich history, however, Inazu's analysis conveys the impression that
"assembly" and "organization" are synonymous terms and that the core of a
recovered freedom of assembly is protection for group autonomy-
particularly for certain well-organized, illiberal groups that face public
disapproval and discrimination lawsuits. This orientation is in large part
owing to Inazu's following the path forged by the Supreme Court, which led
ultimately to recognition of the right of expressive association.
As Inazu clearly recognizes, however, assemblies take many forms.
Assemblies can be quite small or very large. They can have private or public
orientations. Historically, the right to assemble has protected the formation
and composition of a diverse array of private groups including social clubs
and churches. Some of these private groups are formed with the intention of
making public claims, while others seek generally to maintain a more private
existence and profile. Indeed, some groups form with the expectation that
they and their members will remain completely anonymous.
As the discussion in Chapter 2 also shows, assemblies can be formally
or informally organized. We might think of them as being situated on a
continuum, ranging from longstanding institutions to spontaneous and casual
gatherings. Assemblies may be organized with regard to a specific message
or ideology, or they may be looser forms of alliance. They may be heavily
regulated, as in the case of political parties, or they may operate mainly
beyond and outside the state's control. Assemblies may be aligned against
the state, or in some cases constituted specifically to support current public
laws and policies.
Finally, assemblies have both collective and individual characteristics.
They protect both organizational and individual interests. In his recuperative
account, Inazu does not entirely ignore the individual dimension of assembly.
But as I discuss below, for the most part he appears to conceptualize freedom
of assembly as a form of protection for groups and specifically for their
83. Inazu examines virtual assemblies in a forthcoming paper. See John D. Inazu, Virtual
Assembly, 98 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming 2013).
84. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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organizational autonomy. However, as a personal freedom, the right to
peaceably assemble belongs to each of the individuals who choose to
participate in the formation and activities of the common venture.
In sum, assemblies in various forms are everywhere and all around us.
Indeed, wherever two or more people gather in a common space an assembly
has taken place.
The ability to gather in public has been a particularly important aspect
of the freedom of assembly. As American history demonstrates, less
structured and even spontaneous gatherings were in many cases the principal
beneficiaries of a freedom of peaceable assembly. The freedom of assembly
has facilitated traditional public displays such as pickets, demonstrations,
parades, and protests. In contrast to the civic and religious organizations
Inazu focuses on in the book, this is assembly's core dimension.
As Inazu briefly mentions early in the book, the Assembly Clause
protects "the occasional, temporal gathering that often takes the form of a
protest, parade, or demonstration."85 Indeed, I think this is not only the
traditional but perhaps also the most natural reading of the First
Amendment's Assembly Clause. On the infrequent occasions when it has
mentioned assembly, the Supreme Court seems to have agreed. Writing for
all but one Justice in Edwards v. South Carolina86 in 1963, Justice Stewart
described a civil rights demonstration by 187 students on the State Capitol
grounds as the exercise of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition
for redress of grievances "in their most pristine and classic form."8 The
classic assembly consisted of a group of citizens gathered in the public
square for a peaceful and temporary demonstration. These individuals were,
and as I will explain, in some sense remain, most in need of the refuge of
freedom of assembly.
At the end of his historical narrative in Chapter 2, Inazu notes with
evident disappointment that by the 1960s the Supreme Court appeared to
have limited freedom of assembly to public assemblies, protests, and
demonstrations.88 The real disappointment, as Inazu only briefly mentions, is
that within the next two decades the Court buried even this "pristine and
classic" form of assembly under an ever-expanding free speech doctrine.89
Of course, if the Assembly Clause does not protect the most obvious
and traditional associative endeavors, then it could be difficult to establish
that it provides refuge for the formation, composition, and expression of civic
and other organizations that are highly structured and do not exist to make
public claims. Perhaps Inazu believes that protection for the more traditional
forms of assembly such as protests, parades, and demonstrations is
85. INAZU, supra note 2, at 2.
86. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
87. Id. at 235.
88. INAZU, supra note 2, at 61.
89. Edwards, 372 U.S. at 235; INAZU, supra note 2, at 61-62.
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meaningfully assured under the Free Speech Clause, or that such protection
will simply be a natural byproduct of the recognition of group autonomy he
espouses. At least in the specific sense Inazu describes and analyzes the
concept, group autonomy has not been the central concern of traditional
assemblies. Given the challenges to traditional assembly, which included
vigilante responses as well as official forms of suppression and abuse,
restrictions on formation and composition were subordinate concerns. If we
are to fully recover the Assembly Clause, we need to reconceive how it
applies to more traditional forms and functions. In other words, the recovery
effort ought to begin at assembly's roots.
I do not mean to argue that the freedom of assembly cannot be extended
beyond traditional public gatherings, or that its meaning is frozen in time in
some originalist sense. As Inazu observes, groups of individuals who have
historically joined under an organizational umbrella or operated as
hierarchical institutions have long claimed to be engaged in acts of
assembly. 90  Although most of these groups used repertoires like
demonstrations and protests, not all of them did. This history is certainly
some evidence of the American public's own interpretation of assembly.9 1
Moreover, as a matter of simple definition, the groups whose autonomy
Inazu is most concerned with protecting qualify as "assemblies." My
concern is not that Inazu has wrongly or illegitimately interpreted the First
Amendment's text, but rather that in his effort to transform "association"
back into "assembly" Inazu may have given an inordinate amount of
attention to a specific subset or type of assemblies, or to a specific problem
created by the Supreme Court's interpretive adventurism. After Chapter 2,
the more traditional forms of public assembly fade from view. In Part IV, I
will examine how a recovered Assembly Clause might facilitate more
traditional forms of public contention and dissent.
B. Assembly's Functions
As I have noted, Inazu is principally concerned with demonstrating how
and why group autonomy has been harmed by the First Amendment doctrine
of expressive association. Under his account, the primary beneficiaries of a
recovered freedom of assembly would be dissident, exclusionary, and
90. 1 am less certain whether the assembly label applies in cases like Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). In that case, American citizens sought to engage in peaceful
expressive activities such as the teaching of international law to designated foreign terrorist
organizations. Id at 2716. These individuals sometimes occupied common space and worked for a
common purpose. See id (describing the types of activities in which plaintiffs intended to engage,
including training, offering legal expertise, and engaging in advocacy on behalf of the designated
foreign terrorist organizations). In that sense, they meet the definition of an assembly. I am not
certain how Inazu believes a recovered right of assembly would have assisted the plaintiffs in
Humanitarian Law Project or altered the Court's analysis. Inazu seems to use the case primarily to
demonstrate the ambiguity of the right of "expressive association." INAZU, supra note 2, at 4-6.
91. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 17-18 (2011) (emphasizing the
citizenry's understanding of constitutional provisions as an aspect of constitutional interpretation).
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nonconforming organizations or groups. Inazu is particularly concerned with
preserving space in which such groups can participate in self-governance
(relatively) free from state interference. This is especially important for
groups that engage in dissent, fail to conform to consensus norms and
practices with regard to such things as political organization and rational
discourse, and form alliances whose particular message may not be apparent
to outsiders (including, in particular, judges).92 On Inazu's negative reading,
the freedom of assembly allows private groups to resist the state's efforts to
impose what Inazu claims are majority norms of consensus, congruence, and
conformity.
Inazu addresses some of the most important defensive or negative
attributes of a right of peaceable assembly. He argues that assembly is "most
relevant when its exercise is challenged by the state."9 But Inazu's focus on
the struggle between certain private groups and the state's mechanisms of
control downplays some of the more positive and personal aspects of the
freedom of assembly. If we are to fully recover and restore the freedom of
assembly, we must exhume not only its various forms but also its diverse
functions. Moreover, we ought to consider those functions not from the
perspective of the associative right the Supreme Court has recognized, but in
light of the recovery of a freestanding, distinct, and robust Assembly Clause
that this substitute has replaced.
Again, my goal here is more amplification than criticism. Inazu has a
very brief discussion at the beginning of the book concerning what he calls
the "social vision of assembly."9 In addition to enabling meaningful dissent,
he notes that the right of assembly "provides a buffer between the individual
and the state" and contributes to "the shaping and forming of identity."95 As
Inazu wryly observes, "We lose more than the shared experience of cheese
fries and cheap beer when we bowl alone."96
I wish Inazu had elaborated on this "social vision."97  If we accept
Inazu's account, then it follows that the collective forgetting of the freedom
of assembly has imposed significant social and political costs on American
society. In some sense, it is true that constitutional rights are most important
when the activities they protect are being directly challenged by the state.
92. See INAZU, supra note 2, at 156-62 (discussing dissenting, political, and expressive
assemblies). Although Inazu raises some legitimate concerns regarding the interpretation of group
messages, I am more optimistic regarding courts' ability to assess meaning in this and other
contexts. See Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a First
Amendment Ethnography, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2261, 2375-79 (2004) (discussing judicial
interpretation of group membership).
93. INAZU, supra note 2, at 156,
94. Id at 5.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. As Inazu indicates, the "social vision of assembly" he describes is based upon the work of
scholars such as Robert Putnam, Alasdair Maclntyre, Charles Tayor, and Michael Sandel. Id at 5
n.10.
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However, it is also the case that the mere existence and recognition of an
enforceable and robust constitutional right, such as the right to peaceably
assemble with others, can serve critical functions which precede such
challenges-and, indeed, may even prevent them from ever occurring.
Further, even apart from any direct challenges by the state, the right of
assembly can serve a variety of positive functions.
First and perhaps foremost, freedom of assembly provides a degree of
safety and comfort in numbers. It is true, as discussed above, that this same
attribute may increase the danger arising from assemblies. However, let us
assume for the moment that we are talking only about "peaceable"
assemblies. It may be difficult for contemporary Americans to appreciate the
fear those accused in the 1950s of being Communists, or fellow travelers,
experienced when they engaged in the simple act of meeting with others in
private or public settings.98 The ability to freely assemble or join with others
fortifies individuals. It emboldens them to come forward, and to participate
in social and political activities. In addition to creating space for group
activities and group autonomy, the freedom of assembly facilitates a variety
of individual acts of defiance, contention, and expression.
Freedom of assembly also serves various emotional and psychological
functions. The act of assembly creates a sense of solidarity or common
cause. It excites and energizes individuals, whether they gather to knit
scarves, play soccer, pray, or participate in marches or protests. It fosters
personal and civic pride by providing outlets and venues for the pursuit of
common causes. Freedom of assembly does not simply allow individuals to
develop their own identities. It allows otherwise marginalized individuals to
be present with others and to communicate specific identity claims to the
state and to the general public. For many individuals, this is a critical aspect
not only of self-governance but also of personal self-esteem. In sum, a
robust freedom to peaceably assemble with others facilitates full participation
in and enjoyment of communal life.
In political terms, the freedom of assembly encourages and facilitates
forms of local engagement. It provides foundation and structure for social
and political projects. The ability to join with like-minded others allows
citizens to form political associations and encourages them to contemplate
future endeavors and initiatives. This may lead to new and unique
institutions, including new political organizations and parties. Further,
freedom of assembly strengthens and amplifies individual voices. It forces
98. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 103 (1961) (holding
that the right to assemble is secondary to the right of Congress "to bring foreign-dominated
organizations out into the open where the public can evaluate their activities informedly against the
revealed background of their character, nature, and connections"); David E. Bernstein, The Red
Menace, Revisited, 100 NW. U. L. REv. 1295, 1301 (2006) (reviewing MARTIN H. REDISH, THE
LOGIC OF PERSECUTION: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE MCCARTHY ERA (2005)) (providing
background information about the Smith Act and other restrictions aimed at communists that
limited the right of assembly).
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officials and other members of the community to take notice by providing a
rough depiction of individual preferences. In these representative and
democratic senses, assembly acts as an informal method of voting or casting
preferences-a way of marking or identifying oneself, often through public
affiliations, as supportive of a particular position, cause, or side. Note that
assembly serves this particular function whether individuals form a group at
the fringes of societal norms or one situated within a majority consensus.
Inazu suggests that the reason for protecting groups' membership and
leadership choices is that "the existence of a group and its selection of
members and leaders are themselves forms of expression." 99 This obviously
raises the question whether the freedom of assembly he espouses is cut from
the same speech cloth as the right of expressive association. 00 I don't think
that it is. However, had Inazu placed more emphasis on the individual social
and political benefits of assembly, the separation would have been much
clearer. Many of these functions are nonexpressive. They are a form of
social sustenance and a critical part of our political structure. On this view,
the fact that assembly protects the Boy Scouts' ability to express its
preferences through exclusion is not the central point. The critical aspects of
assembly lie beneath the surface of that public message; they are antecedent
to the state's challenge to it.
Inazu's account of freedom of assembly is primarily political rather than
sociological. However, elaborating somewhat on the positive and personal
functions of assembly would have clarified the extent of assembly's
independence from speech. More importantly, it would have allowed for a
fuller recovery and explication of the variety of functions served by the
freedom of assembly.
IV. Assembly and Outdoor Contention
As I noted earlier, perhaps the most natural interpretation of the
Assembly Clause is that it protects an individual's right to gather with others
for some limited period in a public place in order to pursue some common
cause. Thus, whenever and wherever two people gather in a public place
where they have a right to be, for lawful and peaceful purposes, the
Assembly Clause ought to protect their right to do so. As citizens of
authoritarian nations will attest, this is not some secondary or minimal
constitutional concern. 01 Where the freedom of assembly is recognized and
99. INAZU, supra note 2, at 152.
100. See Bhagwat, supra note 63, at 1383 (questioning Inazu's account insofar as it relies upon
expressive values).
101. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, New Russian Law Assesses Heavy Fines on Protesters,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/world/europe/putin-signs-law-with-
harsh-fines-for-protesters-in-russia.html (reporting on enactment of a new Russian law restricting
street demonstrations); Jim Yardley, China Sets Zones for Olympics Protests, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/24/sports/olympics/24china.html?r-3&ref=world
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enforced, authorities cannot without good cause require individuals to
disperse, desist, disband, or move along. This right to be and to remain in
public places lies at the core of the right of peaceable assembly.
Inazu has offered convincing reasons for recognizing other forms of
assembly. However, a recovered Assembly Clause would be as or even more
important to outdoor politics than to the indoor membership decisions of
civic organizations and private businesses.10 2  Admittedly, restrictions on
public protest and assembly were not Inazu's raison d'etre. However, as I
suggested earlier, a full recovery of the Assembly Clause will not be possible
without some consideration of its relation to traditional forms of public
assembly and contention. Inazu's account may offer some important insight
with regard to this more traditional dimension of freedom of assembly. I
want to make this contribution more explicit, and to raise some issues that
require further consideration by Inazu and others who are interested in more
public forms of dissent and contention.
In my own work, I have emphasized the necessity of adequate physical
resources for the effective exercise of public speech, assembly, and petition
rights. 10 3 I have argued that over time, a variety of societal, political, and
jurisprudential forces have reduced the supply of public space that is
available to individuals and groups who wish to engage in expression and
politics out of doors. In brief, these and other forces have produced a
significantly diminished public square. In addition, even in the remaining
public spaces, individuals who wish to engage in speech, assembly, and
petition activities are too often displaced by a variety of regulatory
mechanisms, including the construction of "speech zones."a
Had it been published prior to my own, Inazu's book would have
provided welcome support for my thesis regarding access to public spaces,
particularly public forums. According to the Supreme Court, these are places
such as public streets and parks, which have "time out of mind" been
available "for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions."105 As Inazu notes, in the early
1980s the Supreme Court "swept the remnants of assembly within the ambit
of free speech law."'06 There assembly's remnants were combined with
increasingly anemic public speech and petition rights, which were
&pagewanted-print (discussing China's repression of free speech assembly rights and the country's
attempt to appear less repressive by creating "free speech zones" during the 2008 Olympics).
102. For a recent treatment of this aspect of assembly, see generally Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The
Neglected Right ofAssembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543 (2009).
103. TimoTHY zICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN
PUBLIC PLACES 3-4 (2009).
104. Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TExAS L. REV. 581, 636 (2006).
105. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (describing public forum categories).
106. INAZU, supra note 2, at 61.
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themselves hemmed in by an increasingly restrictive system of bureaucratic
regulations.10 7
Although Inazu focuses primarily on internal group autonomy, his
account of the Assembly Clause has important implications for public
assembly and contention. To examine some of these implications, I want to
consider Inazu's account against the background of the Occupy Wall Street
(OWS) demonstrations. The demonstrations, which occurred across the
United States (and indeed spread to several foreign nations) during the fall of
2011,' are contemporary examples of the sort of public contention that was
common during assembly's robust abolitionist, labor, and civil rights periods.
In part for the reasons Inazu points to in his book, public discussions and
litigation involving the OWS protests focused almost exclusively on free
speech concerns.' 09 This was so even though the Assembly Clause's
language most closely captures the OWS signature repertoire-gathering in
public for a common purpose or purposes.
According to Inazu, "The right of assembly is a presumptive right of
individuals to form and participate in peaceable, noncommercial groups."' 10
OWS is clearly a noncommercial group, and thus entitled to presumptive
protection under the Assembly Clause."' In addition, the OWS
demonstrations served all of the core functions of assembly. They provided
critical outlets for dissenters, nonconformists, and dissidents. OWS
demonstrations allowed and perhaps emboldened individuals to challenge
consensus norms.112  The assemblies facilitated public dissent, politicized
group activity, and provided channels for expression. They created space
within which citizens could resist governmental control. The ability to
assemble with others in common public spaces provided incubation space for
a potential social movement. Further, the OWS assemblies allowed
individuals to experiment with unique forms of democratic organization." 3
107. See generally ZICK, supra note 103 (discussing the restriction of public speech rights
under the First Amendment's public forum and time, place, and manner doctrines).
108. Occupy Wall Street Protests Spread, But Can the Movement Gain Critical Mass?, WASH.
POST, Oct. 13, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/occupy-wall-street-protests-spread-
but-can-the-movement-gain-critical-mass/2011/10/13/gIQAzOM2hL_print.html,
109. See, e.g., Occupy Minneapolis v. Cnty. of Hennepin, Civ. No. 11-3412 (RHK/TNL), 2011
WL 5878359, at *4 (D. Minn. Nov. 23, 2011) (holding that sleeping or erecting tents on public
property by Occupy protesters is protected free speech).
110. INAZU, supra note 2, at 166.
111. See Shelley DuBois, Occupy Wall Street: Yes, There is Organization, CNN MONEY
(Dec. 7, 2011, 11:35 AM), http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2011/12/07/occupy-wall-street-yes-
there-is-organization/ (describing the "grassroots," noncommercial organization of the Occupy
Movement).
112. Cf INAZU, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing the importance of informal group assembly to
democracy).
113. See Meredith Hoffman, Protestors Debate What Demands, If Any, to Make, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/nyregion/occupy-wall-street-trying-to-settle-on-




OWS became well known not just for its outward displays of
commandeering and camping in public places, but also for its internal
methods of communication and unique approach to governance by
consensus.1 4  Finally, as have other public assemblies, the OWS
demonstrations "disrupt[ed] social norms and consensus thinking."' They
initiated a national and international conversation concerning issues like
social equality, fairness, capitalism, and political representation.]1
Perhaps the most frequently commented-upon aspect of the OWS
demonstrations, at least in the mainstream media, was the apparent lack of a
coherent message associated with the demonstrations or the group itself."
Here Inazu offers a key insight. The First Amendment does not protect
assembly solely for the purpose of communicating some identifiable,
coherent message. Assembly is protected in its own right; it stands on its
own bottom. The act of assembling is thus itself the relevant constitutional
event. If individuals want to assemble for the purpose of snapping their
fingers, chanting in tongues, or simply showing solidarity or strength through
numbers, then they have a First Amendment right to do so (subject, of
course, to any permitting and other requirements). Under this approach to
freedom of assembly, no further explication of the specific content of OWS's
message would be required." 8 This is a critical point, for public assemblies
can often be disorganized, spontaneous, cacophonous, and incoherent.
In the context of the OWS demonstrations, we can more fully appreciate
the value of a freestanding freedom of assembly. Thus, perhaps the most
significant move Inazu makes in his volume turns out to be textual. By
divorcing assembly and petition, he allows for the development of a distinct
freedom of assembly. This freedom grants the people the right to be present
in and to use certain public places. They may of course do so to speak or to
petition government officials. But these activities and rights are distinct from
the right to peaceably assemble.
Thus, a full recovery of the Assembly Clause clarifies the extent of the
government's trust obligation regarding public places under its control. It
highlights the scope of the "easement" the people possess when they occupy
114. N.R. Kleinfield & Cara Buckley, Wall Street Occupiers, Protesting Till Whenever, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/201 1/10/01/nyregion/wall-street-occupiers-
protesting-till-whenever.html?pagewanted=all.
115. INAZU, supra note 2, at 3.
116. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Money and Morals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/opinion/krugman-money-and-
morals.html?gwh=IB8B872410A8FFE1376708CD918AFF25.
117. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Occupy Wall Street: A Frenzy That Fizzled, DEALBOOK, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 17, 2012, 8:51 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/occupy-wall-street-a-
frenzy-that-fizzled/ (lamenting the lack of a coherent message from the movement).
118. See INAZU, supra note 2 at 161-62 (observing that assembly itself is expression and
multiple interpretations of an assembly are possible).
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and use public forums."' 9 There has long been some level of discomfort
relating to the idea that the First Amendment imposes an affirmative
obligation on officials to provide space or other resources for the peoples'
exercise of constitutional rights. However, if the First Amendment protects
not only discrete activities like speech and petition, but also simple presence
in public places, then it begins to look very much as if the First Amendment
contemplates a degree of affirmative support. After all, assembly had to take
place somewhere, and the most natural or obvious place would be something
like a public square. Interpreting the Assembly Clause as an independent
form of refuge for public dissent fortifies the argument that the First
Amendment was intended, at least in part, to facilitate public presence and
outdoor politics.
Indeed, recovery of the Assembly Clause might alter or clarify a number
of First Amendment doctrines and principles relating to public protests,
demonstrations, and other forms of outdoor politics like the OWS
demonstrations. Let me highlight just a few examples.
The Supreme Court has attempted to explain how a parade with no
clearly identifiable message nevertheless constitutes either a form of
expressive conduct or an expressive association.120  However, once the
parade is properly characterized and analyzed as an assembly, courts need
not attempt to interpret such gatherings. This insight applies to a variety of
public gatherings. For example, where individuals have gathered in a public
park for the purpose of feeding the homeless, the fact that no particularized
message would be discernible to the public would not make any difference
under the Assembly Clause.' 2' These and other unique but nonexpressive
gatherings could find refuge under the Assembly Clause even if protection is
not available to them under the Free Speech Clause or the expressive
association doctrine.
The Court has also indicated that picketing on a public sidewalk near a
person's residence may be entitled to less protection under the Free Speech
Clause because the protesters did not seek to communicate with a broad
public audience.12 2  That observation, and potential limitation, is simply
irrelevant in the context of the freedom to peaceably assemble on a public
sidewalk-the actual activity in question. Further, resort in some cases to the
Assembly Clause, which by its terms protects a form of conduct, could
reduce some of the considerable pressure the courts have placed on the
speech-conduct distinction. Indeed, recovery of the Assembly Clause might
119. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUp. CT.
REv. 1, 13.
120. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568
(1995) (discussing the expressive nature of parades).
121. See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 610 F.3d 1274, 1292 (11th Cir.
2010), vacated, 616 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2010), reinstated in part, 638 F.3d 756 (1lth Cir. 2011)
(upholding permit requirements as applied to the feeding of homeless in public parks).
122. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486-88 (1988).
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at long last elevate demonstrating, marching, and labor picketing to the status
of fully protected First Amendment activities rather than allowing them to be
consigned to the lesser-protected rung of expressive conduct.12 3
In many public protest cases decided after the 1960s, including several
involving protests near abortion clinics, the Court has used free speech and
time, place, and manner doctrines to examine the constitutionality of limits
on public contention and dissent.124 The primary concern in those cases was
to what extent speakers should have a meaningful opportunity to engage with
their intended audiences. 1 2 5  Indeed, in numerous contexts, courts have
reviewed regulatory requirements that implicate freedom of assembly,
including permit and insurance provisions, as if they affect only the freedom
of speech.126 However, these regulations may have separate and significant
effects on assembly rights. Suppose that courts refocused the inquiry in such
a way that assembly rather than speech became the primary concern. It is
possible that something like the time, place, and manner doctrine would
develop in this context. However, it is also possible that different
considerations would lead to distinct doctrinal formulations and perhaps even
to an expansion of public protest rights.
Let me return a final time to the OWS demonstrations. As noted earlier,
the Assembly Clause contains a textual limitation. It recognizes a right
"peaceably to assemble." Inazu does not offer a definitive interpretation of
this text. It is clear that the Assembly Clause does not protect riotous mobs.
Certainly an assembly that engages in vandalism or violent acts can be
suppressed. Further, under free speech doctrine authorities may impose basic
limitations on public demonstrations for the purpose of ensuring public order
and safety. 27
123. This would require revisiting statements by the Supreme Court in civil rights-era cases to
the effect that the First Amendment provides less protection to acts such as assembly than it does to
pure speech. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965) (suggesting that the freedom to
peaceably assemble was linked to expression and inferior to its purest forms); id at 555 (same).
Justice Black had even less regard for marching, picketing, and parading. Although he often
claimed to be a strict textualist, Justice Black was confident that the state could absolutely bar such
activities on the public streets. Id. at 581 (Black, J., concurring).
124. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719-20 (2000) (examining the constitutionality of a
Colorado statute using free speech and time, place, and manner doctrines); Madsen v. Women's
Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762-64 (1994) (same).
125. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 716 ("The right to free speech, of course, includes the right to attempt
to persuade others to change their views, and may not be curtailed simply because the speaker's
message may be offensive to his audience."); Madsen, 512 U.S. at 774 ("[I]t is difficult . . . to
justify a prohibition on all uninvited approaches of persons seeking the services of the clinic,
regardless of how peaceful the contact may be, without burdening more speech than necessary to
prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the clinic.").
126. See, e.g., Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 326 (2002) (upholding permit
requirement for activities in public parks as a valid regulation of speech).
127. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 713-14 (explaining that protecting the safety of individuals is a
legitimate government interest).
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The OWS demonstrations pressed the boundaries of these limits.'2 8
Insofar as OWS participants were unlawfully present in private spaces, let us
assume that the freedom of assembly offered them no refuge. But in many
cases, protesters sought to permanently occupy public forums and other
public venues.'2 9  Were these "peaceable" assemblies? As I noted earlier,
one could argue that the original or traditional understanding was that the
Assembly Clause contemplated the formation and relatively brief presence of
the people in public places. However, there is nothing in the Assembly
Clause itself that suggests any kind of temporal limitation. There is nothing
violent or unpeaceable about the mere act of assembly or even of occupation.
So long as the occupation does not disrupt the flow of pedestrian or other
traffic, violate any time restriction, or violate noise ordinances and the like,
what basis is there for requiring the assembly to disperse? 3 0
It seems that at least two fundamental questions must be answered. The
first, as I have already suggested, is whether we ought simply to incorporate
all of the various time, place, and manner requirements that are not deemed
generally to abridge freedom of speech131 into the assembly context. In that
case, courts would likely equate "peaceably" with lawfully. This would
essentially mean that in public places where individuals have a right to
congregate, the freedom of assembly is coextensive with the freedom of
speech. However, this would be inconsistent with recognition of a distinct
and separate freedom of peaceable assembly. Second, and perhaps more
fundamentally, we need to address whether the Assembly Clause provides
some refuge for certain forms of civil disobedience.13 2  Since freedom of
assembly was not seriously considered in the OWS litigation, the courts
never reached these issues.
Like the outer bounds of group autonomy Inazu discusses, none of the
foregoing issues has yet received any significant attention in connection with
the Assembly Clause. If or once they do, however, we may find that the First
128. See In re Waller v. City of New York, 933 N.Y.S.2d 541, 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)
(holding that OWS failed to show a right to a temporary restraining order that would restrict the
city's ability to promote health and safety); James Barron & Colin Moynihan, City Reopens Park
After Protesters Are Evicted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/t1/16/
nyregion/police-begin-clearing-zuccotti-park-of-protesters.html?pagewanted=all&_moc.semityn.
www (describing the events surrounding the denial of the order).
129. Joel Banner Baird, To Be Occupied: Burlington's City Hall Park, BURLINGTON FREE
PRESS, Oct. 25, 2011, at Al; Jimmy Vielkind, A Permanent Occupation?, TIMES UNION, Oct.31,
2011, http://www.timesunion.comL/local/article/A-permanent-occupation-2243717.php.
130. See El-Haj, supra note 102, at 578 (noting that, historically speaking, "the government was
considered justified in restricting public assemblies only when they created public disorder, because
only then were the assemblies no longer within the protection of the constitutional right").
131. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-20 (upholding a content-neutral statute designed to protect the
access and privacy of patients by prohibiting speech-related conduct within 100 feet of the entrance
of any health care facility); Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762-64 (holding that certain restrictions imposed
on antiabortion protestors were not directed at the content of speech, and thus were permissible as
protecting the health and well-being of patients).
132. INAZU, supra note 2, at 167.
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Amendment affords some additional measure of refuge for traditional forms
of public protest and contention. Inazu's partial recovery of the Assembly
Clause ought to motivate civil rights litigators, scholars, and courts to start
thinking more carefully about assembly's implications in the more traditional
contexts of public protest and demonstration.
Conclusion
Liberty's Refuge is an enlightening account of a First Amendment
freedom that has for too long languished in the shadow of freedom of speech
and under the weight of a judicially conceived right of expressive
association. The Assembly Clause may never again be feted at something
like a World's Fair. As Inazu shows, the more immediate impact of its
recovery would be felt more locally. Private, nonconforming groups would
gain a fuller measure of autonomy from a recovered freedom of assembly. In
addition, as I have argued, individuals would enjoy the social and political
benefits of a robust and recovered freedom of assembly. Finally, as I have
also suggested, traditional public assemblies would occupy firmer
constitutional ground. We owe a debt to Inazu for his exhumation of a
once-and still-fundamental constitutional liberty. Inazu has invited us to
participate in a conversation about a long-forgotten freedom, and has
provided compelling reasons to accept this invitation. I look forward to
reading his future work and to future discussions regarding the recovered
freedom of assembly.
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MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY. By Stephen J. Schulhofer. New York, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2012. 216 pages. $21.95.
Reviewed by Christopher Slobogin*
I. Introduction
To the average American, the Fourth Amendment probably brings to
mind a jumbled notion of warrants, probable cause, and exclusion of illegally
seized evidence. Compared to the First Amendment, Miranda's right to
remain silent,' the jury trial guarantee,2 and the Equal Protection Clause's
prohibition on racial discrimination, the right to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures is not well understood by most of the
populace, either in its precise scope or its rationale.
Some confusion about specific Fourth Amendment prohibitions is
tolerable and understandable. After all, it is the job of the police and judges,
not Joe Q. Citizen, to apply search and seizure law, and even these
government actors are more than occasionally flummoxed by the rules.
Public ignorance about the Amendment's rationale is perhaps just as
excusable, but it is much more unfortunate. People do not always understand
why the law appears to prefer a judge's opinion over that of the streetwise
cop, why a person who has nothing to hide should care about official
surveillance, or why a person who does have something to hide should be
able to exclude evidence of guilt because the police violated some arcane
rule. As a result, citizens are often outraged by judicial opinions that free
defendants on "technicalities,"4 and seldom are bothered by those court
decisions-much more prevalent in the past several decades-that curtail
liberty and privacy in the name of crime control and national security.
Stephen Schulhofer sees this as a problem, and in More Essential Than
Ever: The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century5 he tries to redress
it. Pitched toward a general audience rather than the legally trained, the book
* Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent. . .
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Id amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See generally William A. Geller, Is the Evidence in on the Exclusionary Rule?, 67 A.B.A. J.
1642, 1645 (1981) (discussing the public policy debate over the exclusionary rule).
5. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2012).
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provides a passionate defense of the "essential" Fourth Amendment that, as
Schulhofer would have it, the Founders intended but the current Supreme
Court has ignored. Much of what is said in this book will not be new to
Fourth Amendment scholars. But the work's straightforward eloquence
provides a strong, popularized brief for interpreting the Fourth Amendment
as a command that judicial review precede all nonexigent police investigative
actions that are more than minimally intrusive. Schulhofer argues that this
interpretation is not only consistent with the intent of the Framers, but
remains a crucial means of discouraging government officials from harassing
innocent people, promoting citizen cooperation with law enforcement efforts,
and protecting the speech and association rights that are indispensable to a
well-functioning democracy.6
Schulhofer's liberal take on the Fourth Amendment is largely
persuasive. This Review points out a few places where Schulhofer may push
the envelope too far or not far enough. But, these quibbles aside, More
Essential Than Ever is a welcome reminder for scholars and the public at
large that the Fourth Amendment is a fundamental bulwark of constitutional
jurisprudence and deserves more respect than the Supreme Court has given
it.
II. Judicial Review as a Means of Protecting Privacy and Limiting
Discretion
More Essential Than Ever is composed of eight chapters, the first two
of which set up the rest of the book. Chapter 1 sketches out the thesis that
was just described. In the course of doing so, Schulhofer describes his views
on the core purpose of the Fourth Amendment. While he appears to accept
the Supreme Court's stance that the scope of the Fourth Amendment is
defined primarily by reasonable expectations of privacy, he reminds us that
the Amendment explicitly speaks not of privacy but of "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects."8 Thus, he
reasons, the Fourth Amendment is not about privacy in the sense of keeping
secrets, but rather protects privacy as a means of ensuring people are secure
in their ability to control information vis-A-vis the government.9 To the
6. See id. at 6 ("[The Fourth Amendment] offers a shelter from governmental intrusions that
unjustifiably disturb our peace of mind and our capacity to thrive as independent citizens in a
vibrant democratic society.").
7. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (stating that a Fourth Amendment search
occurs if "'the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the
challenged search,' and 'society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable"' (quoting
California v, Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986))).
8. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 7 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
9. See id. at 10 (arguing that it never would have occurred to Americans in the eighteenth
century that "by entering into relationships with others, they had given the government unrestricted
access to any information they revealed to trusted social and professional associates"). Schulhofer
later clarifies that the Fourth Amendment is about "the right to control knowledge about our
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argument that innocent people should have nothing to fear from law
enforcement discovery of private information, especially when it can be
discovered without physical intrusion, Schulhofer has the following riposte:
"[S]urveillance can have an inhibiting effect on those who are different,
chilling their freedom to read what they choose, to say what they think, and
to join with others who are like-minded."10 And when this occurs without
justification, "[it] undermine[s] politics and impoverish[es] social life for
everyone." 1
It has become fashionable to criticize the idea that Fourth Amendment
search doctrine is meant to protect privacy. Critics claim that the Fourth
Amendment is really about government power,12 protecting property rights,' 3
or preventing coercion. 14 But all of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights are
about restricting government power. The Fourth Amendment focuses on
protecting particular individual interests from certain types of government
power, and Schulhofer is right that privacy, construed to mean control of
information from unjustified government access, is the dominant focus of
Fourth Amendment doctrine,15 at least as it applies to searches.16 The Fourth
Amendment's prohibition on unauthorized government monitoring of our
activities, thoughts, and plans is a potent limit on official power that protects
against trespass and official coercion but also protects against much more.
Chapter 2 provides a survey of the historical conflicts and cases that led
to the Fourth Amendment. Schulhofer does a masterful job telling the story
of the general warrant. He begins with the sagas of two Englishmen well-
personal lives, the right to decide how much information gets revealed to whom and for which
purposes." Id. at 130.
10. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 13.
11. Id. at 14.
12. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MIss. L.J.
1309, 1338 (2012) ("The new constitutional lodestar, power, is the Fourth Amendment's third act
[after property and privacy].. .. Power seems to be the amendment's essence, not merely a proxy
for something deeper."); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amendment
and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002) ("The Fourth
Amendment protects power not privacy.").
13. Morgan Cloud, A Liberal House Divided: How the Warren Court Dismantled the Fourth
Amendment, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 33, 72 (2005) (arguing for a Fourth Amendment "rooted in
property theories" (emphasis added)).
14. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 446
(1995) (contending that the Fourth Amendment is meant to limit "coercion and violence").
15. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 23-26 (2007) (arguing that privacy is a central value protected by
the Fourth Amendment).
16. Schulhofer confusingly supports his point about the importance of privacy in search cases
by referring to cases involving seizures. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 7 (describing cases
involving the towing of a mobile home and arrests). Seizures are not governed by the expectation
of privacy language used in search cases but rather are defined in terms of interference with
property or movement. Jacobsen v. United States, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (seizure of property
occurs when there is "some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests");
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991) (holding that seizure of a person occurs when he
would not "feel free to .. . terminate the encounter").
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known to Fourth Amendment scholars: John Wilkes, a member of Parliament
whose office was ransacked by government officials seeking proof of
seditious libel under a "nameless warrant,"17 and John Entick, also suspected
of sedition, whose papers were seized pursuant to a warrant issued by an
executive official rather than a judge and that failed to describe the items
sought.'8 Schulhofer also engagingly describes the hullabaloo in the colonies
over the writs of assistance that allowed British officials to search any place
they desired for evidence of unspecified offenses,' 9 and of course he includes
an account of James Otis's famous denunciation of the writs in 1761 .20 From
this type of evidence, Schulhofer concludes that "there is no doubt that
resistance to discretion lay at the heart" of the Fourth Amendment.2'
Schulhofer is right about that. But he moves from that observation to
the further conclusion that this resistance to the tyranny of every "common
Officer" requires ex ante review by a judge for most searches and seizures.22
Making that connection takes more work. The Entick and Wilkes cases
involved searches for and seizures of papers, and the writs of assistance were
aimed primarily at customed goods held by colonial merchants. The
Framers, mostly from the middle and upper classes, may not have cared very
much about whether seizures of ordinary criminals and searches for evidence
of "street crime" were anticipated by a warrant.23 Schulhofer himself notes
that warrantless arrests for routine felonies were permitted upon "reasonable
cause"; that warrantless searches pursuant to arrest were routine; and that
searches of ships, wagons, and other property outside the home at least
"occasionally" took place without judicial authorization.24 Even warrantless
searches of homes occurred in colonial times.
So while the Framers hated the general warrant, they did not necessarily
think specific warrants were or should be the primary means of regulating all
types of government investigations. Schulhofer indirectly concedes this
point,2 6 but insists that modern-day resistance to executive discretion requires
a preference for warrants even in situations in which they may not have been
17. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 24-26.
18. Id at 26-27.
19. Id at 27-30.
20. Id. at 29.
21. Id. at 35.
22. Id. at 36.
23. Indeed, as Schulhofer points out, James Madison supported the Fourth Amendment because
"he feared that popular majorities would enact legislation authorizing broad warrants, to the
disadvantage of the new nation's propertied elite." Id. at 35.
24. Id at 37.
25. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547,
622 (1999) (stating that during the Framing Era "the initiation of arrests and searches commenced
when a crime victim either raised the 'hue and cry' or made a sworn complaint," although also
noting that the hue and cry was probably relegated to "fresh" cases by the late eighteenth century).
26. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 40-41.
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required in colonial times.27 He gives a number of reasons for this position,
but the most prominent of them is the rise of organized police forces, aided
by technological advances, that have vastly expanded government search and
seizure capacity compared to that possessed by the lonely colonial
constable.28
More broadly, this huge shift in the relative power structure leads
Schulhofer to argue for an analytic approach that focuses on original
principles rather than original rules, which is an approach he dubs "adaptive
originalism." 2 9 On this last point, Schulhofer is in league with a number of
scholars. For instance, Donald Dripps has recently argued that trying to tie
modem rules to specific practices that existed in the eighteenth century
makes no sense in a whole host of uniquely modem situations, including
administrative searches, searches of private papers, investigative stops on
less than probable cause, wiretapping, and the use of gunfire to effect the
arrest of a fleeing felon.3 0 Moreover, even the common law rules that can
sensibly be applied today were in the process of changing in the eighteenth
century and were not necessarily favored by the Framers.3 So, like
Schulhofer, Dripps would ask whether and to what extent a search and
seizure threatens "the priority of individual liberty and privacy, as against
public security, that the founders aspired to."32 The key question remains,
however, whether adaptive or aspirational originalism requires the strong
warrant requirement that Schulhofer favors.
III. A Critique of Modem Search and Seizure Rules
Chapters 3 through 7 of More Essential Than Ever try to answer that
question. They address the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in five general
areas: the overarching rules governing searches and arrests; the special
problems that arise in policing on the streets; the law governing
administrative searches such as health and safety inspections, roadblocks and
drug testing of school children; wiretapping and other electronic searches;
and the dilemmas caused by national security concerns. The theme
throughout these chapters is that, in generating current rules, the Supreme
Court "has increasingly put police convenience above ... original Fourth
27. See id at 41 (arguing that though we should respect the Framers' interpretations of searches
and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, "that respect cannot take the form of an unreflective
commitment to old rules that now have radically different effects in practice").
28. See id. at 40 (arguing that eighteenth-century law enforcement was "a small, poorly
organized, amateur affair, a far cry from the sizeable force of well-armed, full-time police who only
a few years later became a constant presence on the streets of American cities and towns").
29. Id at 39-41.
30. See generally Donald A. Dripps, Responding to the Challenges of Contextual Change and
Legal Dynamism in Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 81 MISS. L.1 1085 (2012) (proposing
aspirational originalism).
31. Id. at 1089.
32. Id. at 1128.
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Amendment priorities" and thus failed to curb sufficiently the executive
branch's discretion to invade privacy.33
In Chapter 3, entitled "Searches and Arrests," Schulhofer attacks the
Court's unwillingness to exclude evidence when police violate the rule
governing no-knock entries,34 driving home his point with descriptions of
several incidents in which residents were killed or harmed when surprised by
police.3 ' He disagrees with the Court's decisions allowing pretextual traffic
stops and cajoled consents, 6 and partly as a way of undermining those
decisions he appears to argue that the police should have to obtain a warrant
for all nonexigent arrests, or at least for all nonexigent arrests for crimes that
would have been misdemeanors at common law.3 7 He also seems to think
that warrants should be required for searches of cars in all but the most
exigent circumstances, given the much-expanded use we make of vehicles in
modern times. Finally, he castigates two of the Court's rationalizations for
its retrenchment on the exclusionary rule-the increased professionalism of
the police and the development of alternative remedies 39-by arguing that
neither development has progressed far enough to justify the trust the Court
places in law enforcement.40 In Schulhofer's mind, the suppression remedy
is required in order to deter the police and ensure judicial integrity, and
undercutting it as the Court has done breeds lawlessness.4 1
Chapter 4, "Policing Public Spaces," tackles the special problems that
arise in defining seizures of people and the scope of stop-and-frisk doctrine. 4 2
In contrast to many commentators on the liberal end of the spectrum,
Schulhofer would not reverse Terry v. Ohio,43 the Court's iconic case
sanctioning stops and frisks on reasonable suspicion (a level of justification
33. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 44.
34. See generally Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that violation of the
knock-and-announce rule does not require exclusion of evidence seized as a result).
35. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 46-47.
36. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not recognize pretext arguments when the police action is based on probable cause);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973) (holding that individuals need not be told of
their right to refuse consent).
37. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 52 (arguing that the common law exception permitting
warrantless arrest for felonies "should be interpreted narrowly").
38. Schulhofer states that "[m]ost Fourth Amendment experts find it hard to reconcile the
warrant requirement for homes, suitcases, and paper bags with the no-warrant rule for cars," and
dismisses "the practical challenges involved in immobilizing cars on the roadside while waiting for
a search warrant" by noting the availability of telephonic warrants. Id. at 57.
39. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598-99.
40. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 67 (commenting that the premise that "executive officers
can be trusted to exercise search-and-seizure powers fairly, in the absence of judicial oversight, is
precisely the assumption that the Fourth Amendment rejects").
41. See id at 69 ("[T]he evidence shows that official disregard for fair procedure weakens
public willingness to respect legal requirements and cooperate with law enforcement efforts to
apprehend offenders.").
42. Id. at 71-92.
43. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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short of probable cause).4 He states that "it is hard to imagine how the Court
could have done better" in light of the need to give police flexibility in
dealing with "fast-breaking police actions on the street."4 5  However, he
believes that the Court's subsequent application of Terry and related rules-
ranging from declarations that seizures do not occur when police chase
fleeing inner-city youth or confront factory workers and bus passengers46 to
its holding that reasonable suspicion exists when individuals in high-crime
areas run from the police 4 -"bears little relationship to social or
psychological reality."48 These decisions, he argues, have acquiesced in the
creation of racially tinged "police states" that "affect thousands of citizens
every year, undermining their security, their respect for authority, their sense
of acceptance in the wider community, and even their willingness to assist
law enforcement efforts to control crime."49 He urges reversal of these
decisions and commends the Court for striking down vagrancy laws that give
police discretion to harass people pretextually.50
Chapter 5, on "The Administrative State," takes on the most difficult
area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-searches and seizures that fall
outside the paradigmatic investigation of street crime because they focus on
garnering evidence for regulatory rather than criminal purposes (as with
health and safety inspections of homes) or on special populations (such as
drug testing of school children).5' In these situations the Court has either
diluted the warrant requirement by permitting "area warrants" that are not
based on individualized suspicion or has done away with the warrant and
probable cause requirements altogether on the assumption that "special needs
beyond those of ordinary law enforcement" are involved.52 Following the
dissents in these cases, Schulhofer argues instead that departures from the
judicial review requirement be permitted only when: (1) the objective of the
government's enforcement program is important; (2) normal investigative
methods cannot achieve it; (3) the program is implemented through neutral
44. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 77 (arguing that the Court in Teny "established a
pragmatic framework of relatively flexible powers in order to preserve police capacity to maintain
order in public spaces").
45. Id.
46. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is
not implicated when police confront bus passengers and ask for consent to search their luggage);
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (holding that chasing a fleeing person is not a
seizure); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (holding that questioning of factory workers is
not a seizure).
47. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000).
48. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 84.
49. Id. at 92.
50. See, e.g., Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 63-64 (1999) (striking down a statute
criminalizing failure to disperse upon a police command).
51. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 93-114.




criteria applicable to all; and (4) the primary purpose of the program is not
"prosecutorial." Thus, for instance, Schulhofer believes the Court was
correct in holding that a drug testing program aimed at political candidates
was unconstitutional 54 (because the government interest was not substantial
enough);5 5  incorrect in upholding sobriety checkpoints,5 6  suspicionless
searches of probationers,s? drug testing of students in nonathletic activities,
and spot inspections of junkyards for stolen parts 9 (because less intrusive
investigative alternatives were available);60 and correct in rejecting drug
checkpoints6' and programs designed to test pregnant women for cocaine62
(because of their dominant prosecutorial purpose). In contrast, health and
safety inspections conducted according to neutral criteria64 and airport
checkpoints that monitor everyone do pass muster with Schulhofer.
"Wiretapping, Eavesdropping and the Information Age" is the title of
Chapter 6. Schulhofer's primary target here is the Court's so-called "third-
party doctrine," which holds that when one knowingly exposes information
66to others one assumes the risk the government will acquire the information.
Relying on this rationale, the Court has concluded that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to government surveillance of travel on public
roads and government acquisition of phone logs and bank records.6 7 As have
many others,68 Schulhofer notes that under the Court's third-party doctrine,
53. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 97-98.
54. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
55. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 100-01 (praising the Court for assessing the significance
of the State's interest in drug testing political candidates and for determining that it was not
substantial enough to outweigh the privacy interests at stake); Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
56. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
57. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987).
58. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 665 (1995).
59. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 717 (1987).
60. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 101.
61. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000).
62. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001)
63. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 108; Ferguson, 522 U.S. at 83.
64. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a warrantless code-enforcement inspection
of his personal residence).
65. Schulhofer also appears to be comfortable with border searches and does not discuss
checkpoints for licenses. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 105. Cf Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 657 (1979) (permitting such checkpoints in dictum). Since these seizures might be said to have
a dominant "prosecutorial purpose," it is not as clear how they fare under his model.
66. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REv. 561
(2009) (offering a defense of the often-criticized doctrine).
67. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)
(holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information surrendered to banks).
68. See Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to
Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1239 (2009) (arguing against the "current
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one cannot reasonably expect privacy from government discovery of
information given to a third party even when the disclosure to that party
occurs with the understanding it is confidential, is made for a specific
purpose only, or is unavoidable if one wants to live in modem society.69
Schulhofer's adaptive originalism leads him to reject this result.70 He points
out that "[t]he colonists who conferred with friends while planning the
American revolution did not think that by sharing confidential information
they had lost their right to exclude strangers," 7 and they certainly did not
72
think they had thereby lost their right to exclude the government.
Furthermore, he continues, the Court's equation of citizen or institutional
third parties with government agents is nonsensical in the modern age."
Schulhofer points out that "we routinely deny government the power to
pursue actions that are freely available to individuals"-such as practicing a
particular religion-and, more importantly, "[t]he extraordinary resources
available to the government give it unique power and unique potential to
threaten the liberty and autonomy of individuals." 4
Thus, Schulhofer believes that the tracking of a car using a GPS device,
as occurred in the recent case of United States v. Jones, is a Fourth
Amendment search that requires a warrant based on probable cause even
when it is not effectuated by a trespass on the car76 (the limitation on the
definition of search endorsed by the majority in Jones).n He strongly
endorses Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion in that case voicing
concern that even brief locational tracking can chill freedoms, and he
rejects the gist of Justice Alito's concurring opinion, which would apply the
configuration" of the third-party doctrine rule that holds that "information disclosed to third parties
receives no Fourth Amendment protection").
69. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 126-34.
70. See also Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of
Constitutional Redemption, 91 TExAs L. REv. 147, 154 (2012) (noting that "[a]lmost all originalists
agree that courts should view themselves as constrained by original meaning and that very good
reasons are required for legitimate departures from that constraint").
71. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 130.
72. Id.
73. See id at 128-32 (critiquing the notion that citizens have the option of communicating by
means other than the internet or telephone and arguing that those communications should be
protected).
74. Id. at 136.
75. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
76. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 139 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 960 (Alito, J.,
concurring)) (expressing agreement with Justice Alito's concurring opinion that the police tactics at
issue in Jones were unacceptable interferences with privacy rights).
77. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 ("It may be that achieving the same result through electronic
means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present
case does not require us to answer that question.").
78. Id at 956-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that "[a]wareness that the Government
may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms" and also stating "it may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties").
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Fourth Amendment only to "prolonged tracking" and only as long as the
public does not itself begin engaging in such tracking for convenience or
security purposes.79  Schulhofer would not always require a warrant when
government seeks information from third parties or in every case of knowing
exposure, however.8 0  For instance, he endorses the practice of obtaining
records via a subpoena, challengeable by the target.8 ' And even in the case
of surveillance, Schulhofer would only dictate that a search has occurred
when police use "technology that is not widely available,"82 suggesting that
he believes nontechnological surveillance or surveillance with technology
83that is in "general public use" can escape Fourth Amendment regulation.
Chapter 7 deals with "The National Security Challenge," a development
that has threatened to undercut Fourth Amendment principles even further.84
Schulhofer reminds us that we have come to deeply regret past overreactions
to outside dangers and suggests we will similarly end up ruing post-9/11
phenomena such as the detentions in Guantanamo Bay, the Patriot Act's
sneak-and-peek warrants,8 5 National Security Letters authorizing FBI agents
to gather up any records that are useful in "criminal, tax, and regulatory
,,86matters, and the expansion of electronic surveillance powers under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 7 To Schulhofer, these departures
from the norm can actually have a negative effect on national security
because they overwhelm the government with information, distract officials
from more effective methods of protecting the country, and discourage
cooperation by those groups in society most likely to have information about
potential foreign threats.
79. Id at 962-64 (Alito, J., concurring) ("New technology may provide increased convenience
or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile ... [or]
reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.").
80. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
81. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 134.
82. See id at 142 (noting that "no one suggests that government data mining should be
prohibited altogether" and that the Fourth Amendment is only intended to "assure that invasive
methods of investigation are subject to oversight").
83. The "general public use" nomenclature comes from dictum in Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
84. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 144-69.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3103(a) (2006). Schulhofer would not object to all sneak-and-peek warrants,
however. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 48.
86. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (2006).
87. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
88. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 168 (arguing that "[piroposals ... to relax Fourth
Amendment requirements and 'trade-off' liberty for security ... make counterterrorism efforts more
difficult, not less"). He goes on to discuss the ways in which Muslim Americans are less likely to
cooperate with authorities if they believe the police are targeting their communities without
explanation. Id.
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IV. A Critique of the Critique
Schulhofer makes a compelling case for privacy as the linchpin of
Fourth Amendment protection and for making ex ante review of police
search and seizure decisions the default regulatory stance. Also persuasive is
his position that the Amendment should be viewed as a crucial means of
preserving democracy, encouraging diversity of views, and promoting citizen
respect for and cooperation with police work. Finally, adaptive originalism
makes eminent sense in a country with a strong foundational document that
is over two hundred years old. In short, I am in agreement with the broad
strokes of the book. I'm not as sure about all the particulars.
For instance, many vibrant Western democracies have been able to
control their police without the draconian remedy of exclusion. Contrary to
Schulhofer's assertion,90 routine suppression of evidence found through a
Fourth Amendment violation probably delegitimizes the legal system in the
eyes of most citizens, 91 and thus may contribute to the dissatisfaction with
government that Schulhofer wants to avoid. Furthermore, in many
situations-for instance, the violence and property damage that sometimes
accompany illegal no-knock entries-monetary restitution is a more
commensurate response than exclusion of evidence, as well as more
satisfying when the victim of such acts is innocent of the crime and thus
cannot resort to exclusion. Properly constructed, an action for damages9 2
the only remedy for illegal searches available in colonial times9-is more
likely to accomplish all of the goals Schulhofer seeks: respect for
government (because it punishes the true perpetrators of the illegality, not the
prosecutor); deterrence of misconduct (especially in pretextual traffic and
suspect drug possession cases, which wallet-conscious police will decide are
not worth pursuing); improved professionalism (resulting from police
departments literally having to pay the cost of bad training); and greater use
of warrants (which police will realize immunizes them from liability).9 4
While Schulhofer argues that an effective damages remedy would foreclose
89. See generally Craig Bradley, Mapp Goes Abroad, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375 (2001)
(recounting resistance to, or significant limitations on, the exclusionary remedy in Europe,
Australia, and Canada).
90. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 69 (arguing that "judicial tolerance for Fourth
Amendment violations" creates problems for law enforcement because it "discourages law-abiding
citizens from offering the cooperation needed to catch and convict offenders in future cases").
91. As Schulhofer admits, "Fourth Amendment requirements often garner little public support
[because] [tihey seem like a gift to those bent on wrongdoing." Id. at 171.
92. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing a civil action for the deprivation of
constitutional rights); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
390-97 (1971) (recognizing an action for damages when a plaintiffs injuries resulted from federal
agents' violation of the Fourth Amendment).
93. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 67 ("[J]udicial oversight originally did not involve an
exclusionary rule; the deterrent to an illegal search was the victim's ability to sue for damages").
94. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 445-46 (summarizing the advantages of a damages remedy).
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just as many prosecutions as the exclusionary rule, he may be wrong on that
score;95 in any event, a damages remedy would not flaunt the costs of the
Fourth Amendment in the delegitimizing way the rule does, or involve
judges, lawyers, and juries in trials they know are charades. As an
alternative to attacking police abuse of discretion on the street by vastly
reducing arrests for minor crimes (which is the effect of Schulhofer's more
stringent arrest warrant requirement), the exclusionary remedy might best be
reserved in such cases for evidence not related to the purpose of the search
and seizure, a move that should maximize deterrence of pretextual actions
and spurious consents.
The procedural justice literature upon which Schulhofer relies to make
many of his arguments may also undercut some of his conclusions, especially
in connection with regulation of large-scale crime-control efforts.97
Schulhofer is right that parts of our cities, especially those occupied by
minority groups, mimic police states, and the Court's willingness to blink at
this state of affairs is outrageous, as well as complicit in discouraging
cooperation with the authorities. At the same time, these communities are
rife with crime, and their efforts to deal with that problem-through
appropriately limited loitering statutes, camera surveillance, drug
checkpoints, and the like-should not be foreclosed when they are the
product of local democratic deliberations.9 8  After all, the Framers
themselves passed statutes permitting suspicionless inspections and searches,
some of which were aimed at obtaining evidence of crime.99 The principal
defect of most of the administrative search and seizure cases heard by the
Supreme Court to date is that they involved ad hoc programs established by
the executive branch. 00  If instead authorization from a representative
legislative body is required, if the legislation does not single out a discrete
95. Id at 444 ("With an effective deterrent in place, police who lack probable cause will not
necessarily give up; the more reasonable assumption is that they will simply get more cause.").
96. Ricardo J. Bascuas, Lessons from the Highway and the Subway: A Principled Approach to
Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 787-90 (2007) (making this argument).
97. Schulhofer's most explicit work on this subject is Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American
Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335 (2011).
98. See Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 410-
13 (2000) (using loitering statutes to illustrate the importance of involving the community in
devising effective law enforcement strategies in order to enhance legitimacy).
99. See Fabio Arcila, The Death ofSuspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1275, 1304-10 (2010)
(discussing various Revolutionary period statutes that permitted suspicionless searches).
100. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 71-72 (2001) (scrutinizing a policy
authorizing drug testing of pregnant women formulated by hospital officials and local police); Mich.
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (involving a highway sobriety checkpoint
established by the police department); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34-35 (2000)
(reviewing a drug roadblock established by local police); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 693-
94 (1987) (examining a junkyard inspection program established by legislation but providing no
limits on police discretion); Skinner v. R'y Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 608-12 (1989)
(analyzing a drug testing program for railway workers authorized by legislation that provided no
standards for implementation).
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and insular minority, and if it is implemented in a nondiscriminatory fashion
(e.g., across-the-board or randomly), a better balance between crime control
and individual rights might be achieved.10' Nullification of such legislation
probably would have more community-denigrating effects than the Court's
current jurisprudence.
The same types of points can be made about national security
surveillance endeavors, often aimed at accumulating information about
thousands or hundreds of thousands of people (virtually all of whom are
innocent of any wrongdoing).' 0 2 If, before voting, legislators are required to
imagine application of these programs to themselves and all of their
constituents, they are not likely to approve 1984-type laws, as evidenced by
Congress's resistance to post-9/11 efforts to expand wiretapping authority 03
and its defunding of the infamous Total Information Awareness data-mining
program. 104 And while courts are capable of figuring out when the legislative
process is defective or when the police are unfairly implementing a
legislatively authorized program, they are not equipped to make the nuanced
determination, required by Schulhofer's approach, as to which law
enforcement techniques are the most effective, least intrusive, most feasible
means of achieving government aims. 0 5 Schulhofer's added stipulation that
prosecution not be the dominant purpose of these programs has the ironic
consequence, as he acknowledges, of providing more privacy protection for
those who may be engaged in criminal activity than those who are not.106
Conversely, when law enforcement has targeted a specific individual,
whether for prosecutorial or other reasons, the legislative process cannot
work and judicial review before the search and seizure takes place is crucial.
For this reason, Schulhofer's disdain for the third-party and knowing-
exposure doctrines, which often work to vitiate ex ante review, is well-
grounded. What is not as clear is why he would require probable cause for
technologically sophisticated tracking of any length while permitting the
government to obtain bank, credit card, and phone records with a subpoena
(which at most requires a showing that the records are somehow relevant to
101. This approach, based on political process theory, was first proposed by Richard Worf in
The Case for Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L.
REv. 93, 197-98 (2007), and is developed further in Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets,
73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 143 (2010).
102. See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, House Approves Another Five Years of Warrantless
Wiretapping, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 12, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/house-
approves-another-five-years-of-warranttess-wiretapping (reporting on the FISA Amendment Act's
goal of intercepting American citizens' international communication).
103. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 158-59.
104. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004, PUB. L. No. 108-87, § 8131, 117 Stat.
1054, 1102 (2003).
105. See Slobogin, supra note 101, at 127-29 (explaining that while the Court can engage
thoughtfully in strict scrutiny analysis in various contexts like time, place, and manner restrictions
on speech, it is ill-equipped to analyze the efficacy and necessity of law enforcement techniques).
106. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 95-96.
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an investigation),o 7 or why he would leave entirely unregulated even long-
term surveillance with the naked eye or with generally available
technology. 0 8  In terms of intrusiveness and the chilling effect on innocent
activity-Schulhofer's concerns-record acquisition would seem at least as
intrusive as tracking. 09 Further, tracking with a GPS would seem to be no
more inimical to these interests than monitoring travels with the human
senses or technology in general public use. 0  An alternative would be to
permit both accessing of single-transaction records and short-term tracking-
whether the police use naked-eye observation, primitive technology, or
sophisticated devices-on reasonable suspicion, while requiring probable
cause for acquisition of records containing substantial personal information
and more prolonged surveillance."'
It is also not clear how Schulhofer would treat undercover
investigations, since he does not discuss the relevant case law in the book.
Perhaps he would analogize this popular law enforcement technique to
naked-eye and low-tech surveillance, in which case, consistent with Supreme
Court decisions on the issue, it would be unregulated by the Fourth
Amendment." 2 But the ability of undercover agents to insinuate themselves
into personal lives can often result in much more intrusion than even long-
term tracking, and thus ought to require at least as much justification (as the
eighteenth-century disdain for undercover "thief-takers" suggests)." 3  Only
107. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (stating that a subpoena should
only be quashed on irrelevance grounds when "there is no reasonable possibility that the category of
materials the government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand
jury's investigation"); United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (stating that
administrative subpoenas meet constitutional requisites even if they are meant only to satisfy
"nothing more than official curiosity").
108. Indeed, Schulhofer's primary concern with data mining appears to be, not its breadth, but
its use of technology not widely available to the public. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 142
(making the use of "technology that is not widely available" a critical element of a "search" under
the Fourth Amendment).
109. Cf Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations ofPrivacy
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized
and Permitted by Society, " 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 737 (1993) (reporting data indicating that perusal of
bank records is considered more intrusive, by a significant margin, than tracking a car).
110. Schulhofer notes that, at common law, public movements were not considered private.
SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 123. But research indicates that "conspicuously" following someone
down the street is viewed as fairly intrusive, albeit not as intrusive as technological tracking of a car
for three days. SLOBOGIN, supra note 15, at 112.
111. These points are developed further in Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United
States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of "Mosaic Theory," DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2012) and Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment
Relevant in a Technological Age?, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
11 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011).
112. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293. 302-03 (1966) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to evidence voluntarily disclosed to an informant).
113. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 677-81 (2009) (describing police and jury distrust of
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when the third party is neither an agent of the government nor an impersonal
entity like a bank should the third-party doctrine permit government to
acquire the third party's information without any Fourth Amendment
justification. In other words, the Fourth Amendment would be inapplicable
in third-party scenarios only when the third party is independent of the
government and can be said to possess a right (as an autonomous being) to
disclose to the government any information he or she sees fit to reveal.114
Undoubtedly, Professor Schulhofer would have responses to all of these
points. In any event, all of them only attack his thesis at the edges, without
disturbing the crucial attributes of the Fourth Amendment's principles that he
articulates and defends. More Essential Than Ever successfully captures the
essence of the Fourth Amendment in a way that should bring home to
everyone-not just lawyers and judges, but the "I've got nothing to hide"
crowd, the "inner-city folks are all criminals" crowd, and the "government
can be trusted" crowd-why it is so important.
thief-takers, who received rewards for turning in thieves that they often enticed into engaging in
theft).
114. See Mary 1. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of
Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1643 (1987) (arguing that people in possession of
information about others, even information that is "private" and obtained through an intimate
relationship, have an "autonomy-based right to choose to cooperate with the authorities").
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